

**Strategic Plan**  
**FY2001 – 2008**  
for the  
**West African Regional Program**  
**(WARP)**

**US Agency for International Development**  
**Regional Strategy Team**  
**Africa Bureau**  
**March 2000**



## PREFACE

The West African Regional Program (WARP) strategic plan, commissioned by the Africa Bureau under the guidance of the Governing Board (GB) of the Regional Strategy Team (RST), began work in May 1999. The decision emerged following the GB's approval of an initial group of six diagnostics papers. The diagnostic papers, prepared by the RST in response to the West Africa Regional Concept Paper and Recommendations for Programmatic Action November 1998, were completed in the Spring of 1999. The diagnostic reports constitute an in-depth review of six priority sectors the GB identified for potential Agency support under a synchronous program for catalyzing the pace of regional integration (October 1998). The issues identified include: regional economic integration, and integrated energy systems, health population and nutrition, food security, environment and natural resources management, and democracy and governance.

In preparing the diagnostic papers, the RST sought extensive technical input from prominent West African institutions, donors, other USG Agencies, including the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Justice, along with the National Security Council, and the Trade and Development Agency. Additional input came from numerous USAID technical resource personnel based in Washington, and field missions. The WARP strategy presented here is a synthesis of the diagnostics papers. It is an operational framework that describes the types of activities to be pursued, the personnel and financial resources needed for implementation, expected results, and benchmarks against which to measure progress.

WARP is the first of a multi-phased approach for reaching the goal of "A Politically Stable and Economically Prosperous West Africa". It is premised on a common theme found throughout the analyses: that most West African countries cannot function in isolation as economically viable entities -- that regional integration is essential for sustainable development, and that sustainable development cannot be achieved without political stability.

Within each of the strategic focus areas, we briefly discuss how regional approaches can contribute to removing the identified constraints to regional cooperation or integration and distinguish the merits of regional approaches and bilateral program focus. From its establishment in June 1998 to the present, the RST relied heavily on a team-based approach to both the process and the outcome, presented here, emphasizing team ownership and high performance as shared values to effective strategy development.

The cornerstone to the RST's completion of the Agency's first coherent regional program for West Africa should be attributed in part to the commitment of the 12 person GB, whose combined development experience quickly narrowed strategy focus, thereby accelerating the pace of strategy development. The RST has benefited from the enthusiastic support and high priority accorded the team's effort by the USAID/Mali director, and the American Embassies in West Africa, and the relevant mission support units in Bamako. Chaired by the senior Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Africa Bureau, the GB also includes the Directors of the Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal Operating Units, and the Directors of AFR/DP, AFR/SD, AFR/WA and BHR/FFP. Were it not for this support, it is doubtful we could have reached this stage.

The WARP and preceding Concept Paper and Diagnostics Reports are the products of many hands and much collaboration and interaction among many people.

There were three primary stages to the completion of the strategy, with some individuals participating in all three phases. Along with myself, these people include Joan Atherton, Mathias Bassene, Marc Debay, Nancy Estes, Curt Grimm, Bob Groelsema, Jim Hradsky, Rod Kite, Bernard Lane, Walter Knausenberger Mike McGahuey, Hope Sukin, Wilbur Thomas, and Art Westneat. Sharon Pauling, Asif Shaikh, Bob Winterbottom and John Schamper also contributed to the first phase of the WARP.

During the second phase Matt Addison, John Ayoade, Robert Blumberg, Carl Duisberg, Fadel Diame, Joseph Getier, Sam Olofin, Frank Young, Dirck Stryker contributed time and effort. Carol Grigsby, David McCloud, Ibrahim Kimto, Massa Coulibaly, Kevin Sturr, Erin Soto, Richard Greene and Harry Lightfoot worked on both the first and second phases of the WARP. David Atteberry and Felix Awantang, Mike Enders, Khadijat Mojidi, and Frank Young participated in the second and third phases of production.

Additional contributors to the final strategy presented here include Andy Cook, Jan Stromsem, Jean Harman, Nance Kyloh, Michael Marx, Norm Nicholson, and Rebecca Niec.

Special appreciation goes to Jean Harman who also generously gave of her time and technical expertise as technical editor of this document.

Moussokoro Kane and Oumou Diakité unrelentingly provided all logistics and administrative support throughout each stage of the process.

In memory of Jeff Metzel, the RST dedicates the implementation of the WARP to Jeff and his family.

Dr. Abdul H. Wahab  
Team Leader  
March 23, 2000

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The FY2000-2001 West African Regional Program (WARP) Strategic Plan is an Agency operational framework for responding to the opportunities for supporting the efforts of West African countries to catalyze the pace of regional integration -- an effort which began about 25 years ago. The WARP is a logical step to program development. The Governing Board (GB) in May 1999 decided that improving regional integration is the appropriate strategic approach for addressing the serious economic, political and social development problems affecting the countries of West Africa.

The sixteen ECOWAS countries are the core geographic area of the WARP strategy. Some activities also incorporate Chad (a CILSS member), Cameroon (headquarters of OHADA), and the other UDEAC (*Union Douaniere des Etats D'Afrique Centrale*) countries (Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville).

The WARP is a coherent programmatic approach for guiding the Agency's investments during an eight (8) year period in the areas of regional trade, economic integration, energy, food security, environment and natural resources management, tropical diseases, the spread of HIV/AIDS, population pressures, increased popular participation in political processes, and conflict prevention. The goal of the WARP is a "Politically Stable and Economically Prosperous West Africa". This goal is based on a fundamental conclusion that development in West Africa will progress at reasonable rates provided two fundamental conditions are met: (a) governance is significantly improved; and (b) regional economic integration becomes a reality. The alternative to successful regional integration is continued extensive donor support.

The WARP Strategic Plan includes a Results Framework (RF) for three Strategic Objectives (SOs) and one Special Objective (SPO). The RF includes the respective Intermediate Results (IRs) and Performance Indicators (PIs), estimated resources required and a proposed management plan for effectively implementing the SOs and SPO.

The WARP Strategy includes:

- 1) SO1 - Regional economic integration in West Africa strengthened in West Africa;
- 2) SO2 - Increased, sustainable use of selective reproductive health, HIV/AIDS-STI, and child survival services and/or products in West Africa;
- 3) SO3 - Food security and environmental/natural resources management policies and programs strengthened and implemented in West Africa; and
- 4) SPO - Early detection and response mechanisms to prevent regional conflicts established and functioning.

The WARP areas of focus converge with both USAID goals and the U.S. national interests contained in the Strategic Plan for International Affairs Agencies (SPIA). These interests include broad-based economic growth, agricultural development, and global economic prosperity. Additional national interests include stabilization of world population, human health protection; the world environmental protection, and improved global climate stabilization, democracy, governance, and human rights, with regional political stability.

The cross-cutting themes identified as constraints to regional integration have been synthesized throughout the program, including improving governance, strengthening relevant institutions, expanding access to information, and developing donor coordination mechanisms at the regional level. With this strategic approach, opportunities for joint programming and implementation through training, using common methodologies, best practices and standards that can be applied and shared regionally will be pursued.

Current funding proposals for the WARP indicate that the regional program will obligate about \$28 million per year. This estimate includes the \$7 million from the ongoing SRP and the \$15 million from the FHA project plus an additional \$2 million earmarked for expanding HIV/AIDS prevention activities. Additional resources from ATRIP will enhance the WARP, in addition to \$2 million of other DA and ESF funding. Additional funding may be available through the use of monetized local currency from regional PL 480, Title II development activities managed by PVOs.

The fourth Governing Board (GBIV) was held in Dakar December 1-3, 1999. The GBIV meeting participants reaffirmed the GBIII decision to constitute RST as a separate management unit and recommended that the WARP be headed by a Director. Subsequently, the GBIV concluded that the WARP could be implemented with existing USDH FTE levels. The core unit for the WARP implementation will remain in Bamako, Mali, with some staff based in other bilateral missions.

The USAID/Washington review of the Strategic Plan for the West Africa Regional Program was held in February 2000. It resulted in the approval of WARP FY20001-2008 Strategic Plan as revised herein.



# Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
ACP	<i>Afrique, Caraïbes, Pacifique</i>
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFR/SD	Africa Bureau/Sustainable Development Office, USAID
AFR/WA	Africa Bureau/West Africa Office, USAID
AGRHYMET	Agro-climatological, Hydrological and Meteorological Center
AID/W	Agency for International Development/Washington
ATRIP	Africa Trade and Investment Program
BHR/FFP	Bureau of Humanitarian Relief/Food for Peace Office, USAID
BHR/OFDA	Bureau of Humanitarian Relief/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resources Management
CCA	Corporate Council on Africa
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CCD	Convention to Combat Desertification
CEAO	<i>Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>
CERPOD	<i>Centre de Recherches en Population et Développement</i>
CI	Credit Investment
CILSS	<i>Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel</i>
CMA/AOC	<i>Conference des Ministres de l'Agriculture de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre</i>
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa
CPM	Conflict Prevention Mechanism
CPR	Contract Performance Report
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DG	Democracy and Governance
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
EAGER	Equity and Growth through Economic Research, an AFR/SD activity
EC	European Community
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMEMP	Environmental Monitoring Evaluation and Management Plan
ENV/NRM	Environmental/Natural Resource Management
EOC	Election Observation Center
ESF	Economic Support Funds
ESMAP	Energy Sector Management Assistance Project
EU	European Union
EMU	European Monetary Union
FCFA	Franc CFA
FGC	Female Genital Cutting
FHA	Family Health and HIV/AIDS Activity
FOWA	Forum of West Africa
G	Global Bureau, USAID
G/EGAD/AFS	Global Bureau/ Economic Growth and Agricultural Development/ Agriculture and Food Security Office/ USAID
GB	Governing Board
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GTN	Global Technology Network
HIV	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
HKI	Helen Keller International
IASP	International Affairs Strategic Plan
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IER	<i>Institut d'Economie Rurale</i>
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizations
IMCI	Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INSAH	<i>Institut du Sahel</i>
IR	Intermediate Results
LAP	Livestock Action Plan
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Mediation and Security Council
MSU	Michigan State University
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
NEAPs	National Environmental Action Plans
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NID	National Immunization Day
NOAA	National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency
NRM	Natural Resource management
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	Office for Development Assistance
OHADA	<i>Organisation pour l'harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique</i>
OMC	Observation and Monitoring Centers
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
ORS	Oral Rehydration Salts
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
OYB	Operation Year Budget
PCASED	Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PHN	Population, Health and Nutrition
PPC	Policy and Program Coordination Office
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PREGEC	<i>Prevention et Gestion des Conflits</i>
PSU	Private sector support unit
REDSO/WCA	Regional Economic Development Support Office for West and Central Africa
REFESA	<i>Reseau des Femmes Saheliennes</i>
SISERA	Secretariat for Institutional Support to Economic Research in Africa
SO	Strategic Objective
SPLA	Strategic Plan for International Affairs Agencies
SPO	Special Objective
SRAP	Sub-Regional Action Plan
SRP	Sahel Regional Program
STI/HIV/AIDS	Sexually Transmitted Infections/Human Immuno Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
TDA	Trade Development Agency
UDEAC	<i>Union Douaniere des Etats D'Afrique Centrale</i>
UEMOA	<i>Union Economique Monetaire Ouest Africain</i>
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UPDEA	Union of African Electricity Producers and Distributors
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WA	West Africa
WAEN	West Africa Enterprise Network
WAGP	West Africa Gas Pipeline
WAMA	West Africa Monetary Authority
WAPEX	West Africa Power Expansion
WAPP	West African Power Pool
WARP	West Africa Regional Program
WCA	West and Central Africa
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WHO/AFRO	World Health Organization/Africa
WTO	World Trade Organization

# West African Regional Program Strategic Plan

## I. OVERVIEW

The goal of the West African Regional Program (WARP) is a “Politically Stable and Economically Prosperous West Africa”. The diagnostic and consultative process has led the WARP Governing Board to determine that helping to improve regional integration is the appropriate strategic approach to achieve this goal.

The sixteen ECOWAS countries are the core geographic area of the WARP strategy. ECOWAS countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Some activities also encompass Chad (a CILSS member), Cameroon (headquarters of OHADA), and the other UDEAC (*Union Douaniere des Etats D’Afrique Centrale*) countries (Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville).

This Overview (Section I) provides a general look at economic, political and social trends in West Africa to give the summary context, synthesized from the extensive diagnostic and analytic work done to prepare the USAID WARP strategy.<sup>1</sup> Section II presents the proposed strategy for each of the three SOs and the SPO and discusses the constraints and opportunities for the specific areas determined to be within the US strategic interest. Section III describes the resource requirements and Section IV, the program implementation plan.

### A. Macroeconomic, Political, and Social Trends

West Africa remains one of the world’s greatest development challenges. By nearly all indicators the region ranks as the poorest in the world, with the highest rate of population growth, and one of the lowest levels of human capital development. West Africa’s problems are regional in scope because underlying factors that create them are not contained within national borders. Political instability in one country spills over to the region as victims of internal fighting seek refuge in, and plot revenge from, neighboring countries. Similarly, infectious disease spreads across borders when uncontrolled. Poor transportation and communication infrastructures between countries raise the cost of doing business and penalize landlocked countries. Each of these problems deter investments and lower economic performance throughout the region. There is growing consensus among public, private, and donor groups that the regional nature of these problems require regionally coordinated solutions.

Common themes ran throughout the consultative process during the preparation of this strategy; most West African countries cannot function in isolation as economically viable entities; regional integration is essential for sustainable development; and sustainable development will help insure political stability. West Africans are fully aware of this fact, demonstrated by the more than 40 regional organizations created over the last 25 years.

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to the bibliography for a complete listing of diagnostic papers prepared as a result of consultations held in 1998 and 1999.

Among these institutions, the strategy development team determined that three major regional organizations are key to the integration of the region: ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), UEMOA (*Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine*), and CILSS (*Comité Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel*). Each of these organizations has existed since the 1970s (CEAO, was created in the 1960s and was restructured as UEMOA in 1994.)

The CILSS was created in 1973 with nine member countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad. Its objective is to improve ecological equilibrium through research on food security, drought and desertification issues. Currently six major programs are being implemented, two at the CILSS headquarters in Ouagadougou, four at its specialized institutes: INSAH in Bamako and AGRHYMET in Niamey. The CILSS, with current activities that complement the WARP objectives, is a positive integrating force for West Africa. While the CILSS and Club du Sahel were focused initially on the region's short-term needs, the emphasis is now on long-term requirements, with an effective food early warning and monitoring systems in Africa. The CILSS recently reorganized to become a more efficient results-oriented regional organization. Its six major programs operate under three-year strategic plans with well articulated objectives and annual results reporting and budget-setting reviews attended by member states and donor representatives. This ensures that CILSS programs and results are fully vetted and agreed upon among CILSS states and donors. Demonstrations of organizational maturity pinpoint CILSS as a regional organization USAID can continue to rely on to achieve the objectives to be undertaken by the WARP Strategic Plan.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (French acronym, UEMOA), which is comprised of the countries of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin, is not exclusively a monetary union, but also is working toward the economic integration of the member countries. UEMOA's objectives are: (1) reinforce the competitiveness of the economic and financial activities of Member States in the context of an open and competitive market with a rationalized and harmonized judicial environment; (2) ensure the convergence of the macro-economic performances and policies of Member States with the institution of a multilateral control procedure; (3) create a common market among Member States based on the free circulation of the people, goods, services, and capital, and on the right of people exercising an independent or remunerated activity to establish a common external tariff as well as a common commercial policy; (4) institute a coordination for the national sector-based policies with the implementation of common actions and common policies, especially in the following areas: community-based land reclamation, agriculture, environment, transport, infrastructures, telecommunications, human resources, energy, industries, mines, and crafts; and (5) harmonization of legislation, especially the fiscal system, of the Member States as necessary, for the proper functioning of the common market. As the most effective regional organization in West Africa, UEMOA will be a key partner for USAID.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975, includes all sixteen West African nations. The primary objective of the Lagos Treaty is the creation of an economic and monetary union. The monetary program adopted by the Community has the medium-term objectives of achieving regional convertibility of the nine national currencies and, in the longer term, the creation of a single monetary zone. In 1999, an ECOWAS travelers check was launched to facilitate regional travel and commercial transactions. A three-phase program has almost been completed for

establishing the free movement of West Africans throughout the Community, with the right to reside and live in any of the member countries. Through the development and inter-linking of regional transportation, telecommunication and energy systems, ECOWAS is pursuing the physical integration of the region. Member States have committed themselves to the coordination and harmonization of national economic and financial policies in order to enhance the effectiveness of national structural adjustment and economic reform programs. Moreover, in the Treaty, particular emphasis has been placed on promoting the involvement and participation of the private sector and civil society in the development and integration of the economies of the region. The organization encouraged the establishment and functioning of a privately-owned regional commercial bank (ECOBANK), Federation of West African Manufacturers Associations, Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, West African Journalists Association, West African Youth Union, West African Women's Association and the West African Road transporters Union. Although there has been difficulties in getting member states to implement the protocols and mandates of ECOWAS, the organization nonetheless remains a key partner for USAID, and a mechanism for working to enhance cooperation between the francophone and anglophone countries in the region.

Despite over 25 years of effort to achieve regional integration, actual integration at present remains illusive in West Africa and the economic performance of the region has been poor. Nonetheless, after two decades of stagnant or negative economic performance, West Africa has begun to show positive trends.

As a group, the member-countries of UEMOA are the most successful in the region -- UEMOA has an integrated monetary policy, its eight member countries are expected to implement a common external tariff in 2000 and UEMOA is supporting an effort by OHADA (*Organisation pour l'harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires*) to harmonize commercial laws in Africa<sup>2</sup>. Per capita GNP in 1997 in the UEMOA countries was \$402, considerably higher than the ECOWAS countries as a whole and about \$100 greater than the non-UEMOA countries in ECOWAS (Table 1).

**Table 1:  
1997 Population and GNP Comparisons: ECOWAS, UEMOA and Nigeria**

ITEM	UEMOA	ECOWAS	ECOWAS Excluding UEMOA	ECOWAS Excluding Nigeria	Nigeria
<b>GNP (billion \$)</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>71.5</b>	<b>45.4</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>33.4</b>
<b>POPULATION (millions)</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>Per capita GNP (\$)</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>334</b>	<b>305</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>283</b>
<b>Data do not include Liberia.</b>					
<b>Source: World Bank, <u>World Development Indicators</u>, 1999.</b>					

The population of the UEMOA countries (65 million) is just over one-half that of the population of Nigeria. The combined GNP is substantially lower, in part a reflection of the

<sup>2</sup> This is known as the OHADA treaty and has already been signed by 14 Francophone countries, which extends beyond UEMOA.

petroleum wealth of Nigeria.<sup>3</sup> The size of Nigeria also causes some concern about the likelihood of the region achieving real integration, because experience has shown that regions with one dominant economy have difficulty achieving economic integration.<sup>4</sup> This risk is increased by the fact that most of the countries in this region have agriculturally-based economies with most non regional, global trade, tied to the production of primary commodities. The countries of the region continue to depend on the agricultural sector for growth, frequently competing for similar markets.

As a group, neither the ECOWAS nor the UEMOA member countries generate enough income for the average person to avoid a \$2/day poverty line. Worsening long-term poverty levels are perhaps the greatest failure of the ECOWAS economies. Per capita growth in GNP for the period 1965-1997 was either negative or zero in 9 of the 16 countries in West Africa, and none of the countries in West Africa posted a growth rate above one percent.<sup>5</sup> As a consequence, in 9 of the 16 countries real GDP was less in 1997 than it was in 1975. Poverty levels have remained high, ranging from 87% of the population in Guinea-Bissau to 18% in the Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, poverty data indicate 80% of the poor are rural. Several countries have done better in recent years. Ghana and Cape Verde for example, are no longer considered among the least developed countries by the UNDP. All of the UEMOA countries have posted growth since 1994 when the CFA franc was devalued. With the exception of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Niger, the 1997 GNP per capita growth was positive in the ECOWAS states. The assertion that political stability and economic growth are linked is illustrated by the negative 20% growth rate by Sierra Leone, the fact that Liberia's performance is not even measured, and that Niger posted zero growth in 1997.

Social indicators, such as literacy rates, access to safe water and health care have improved over time, but are still far from inadequate. Even in Ghana; the highest ranking country in the region in terms of human development, 35% of adults are not literate. In addition, 75% of the Ghanaian population do not have access to health services. The Sahelian (CILSS) countries tend to have the worst social indicators, but the indicators for the coastal countries are little better. Adult illiteracy is generally above 60% in the CILSS countries. In Niger, for example, about 87% of the adult population is illiterate.

An example that shows progress and gives some idea of the labor force quality for the future is the illiteracy rate for women aged 15-24. Togo has the lowest illiteracy rates (declined from 68% in 1980 to 11% in 1997), followed by Ghana (declined from 48% to 17%), and Nigeria (decline from 57% to 20%). All of the other countries in the region have made progress, but illiteracy levels for the women are still high. The population in Burkina Faso was 92% illiterate in 1980. It is now 81% illiterate. Almost one-half of women of this age group in the Côte d'Ivoire are still illiterate. Illiteracy rates for males of this age group, while lower than for females, also remains high. Except for Ghana, Togo and Nigeria, the illiteracy rate remains at 30% in 5 countries, more than 40% in 2 countries, and above 50% in two countries. This suggests that the quality of the labor force will remain problematic in the mid-term.

For the long-term, it is worth noting that about 50% of the population in the region is below 15 years old and that state expenditures on health and education are very low. This is

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<sup>3</sup> Unless note otherwise, all data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999 CD-ROM., which should be considered as an annex to this document.

<sup>4</sup> Shaw, T., The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS, St. Martin's Press, 1994

<sup>5</sup> Excludes Liberia (member of ECOWAS) and includes Chad (member of CILSS, but not ECOWAS).

compounded by high population growth rates, historically in the 2.8-3% range (Table 2). Urban population growth rates are much higher, ranging from 3.7-11.2%, reflecting the increasing urbanization throughout the region. Within the next 25 years, at least 75% of the ECOWAS countries will be predominantly urban, yet none of the countries are able to provide the services and infrastructure needed to serve the rapidly growing urban centers.

**Table 2:**  
**Health Indicators and Population Growth in West Africa**

Country	Prevalence of child Malnutrition	Under-five Mortality Rate		Adult HIV Prevalence	Safe water		Sanitation		Average annual Population growth rate	
	Weight For age  % of Children Under 5	per 1,000		% of population aged 15-49	% of population with access		% of population with access		% per year	
	1992-97*	1980	1997	1997	1982	1995	1982	1995	1980-97	1997-2015
Benin	29	214	149	2.1	14	72	10	24	3.0	2.6
Burkina Faso	33	..	169	7.2	35	..	5	..	2.4	2.3
Cameroon**	..	173	78	4.9	36	41	36	40	2.8	2.5
Cape Verde	N/A									
Chad	39	235	182	2.7	31	24	44	21	2.8	2.7
Côte d'Ivoire	24	170	140	10.1	20	72	17	51	3.2	1.7
Gambia, The	26	216	..	2.2	42	50	77	37	3.6	2.3
Ghana	27	157	102	2.4	..	65	26	32	3.0	2.3
Guinea	24	299	182	2.1	20	55	12	14	2.6	2.1
Guinea-Bissau	23	290	220	2.3	24	53	25	21	2.1	1.8
Liberia	N/A									
Mali	40	..	235	1.7	..	48	21	37	2.6	2.9
Mauritania	23	175	149	0.5	37	64	..	32	2.7	2.4
Niger	43	320	..	1.5	37	48	9	17	3.3	3.1
Nigeria	39	196	122	4.1	36	50	..	57	3.0	2.5
Senegal	22	190	110	1.8	44	50	..	..	2.7	2.4
Sierra Leone	..	336	286	3.2	24	34	13	..	2.3	1.9
Togo	19	175	138	8.5	35	55	14	41	3.0	2.4
ECOWAS	27	196	143	3.5	26	51	16	26	2.8	2.3
UEMOA	29	170	145	4.4	26	50	13	24	2.8	2.4
ECOWAS-UEMOA	23	230	140	2.4	26	53	21	29	2.9	2.3
CILSS	31	178	133	2.5	31	42	19	21	2.8	2.5
Low income		182	118		47	69	12	29	2.3	1.7
Middle income		85	43		..	79	..	..	1.5	0.9
High income		15	7		97	..	..	..	0.7	0.3
Europe EMU		16	6		95	..	..	..	0.3	-0.1

Source: World Development Indicators, 1999.

\* Data are for the most recent year available. \*\* No data available for Cape Verde or Liberia \*\*\* Cameroon is included because it is part of the FHA program and the headquarters of OHADA.

Access to social services also remains problematic. Seventy percent of the population in Niger does not have access to health services and 83% does not have access to sanitation. While Mali has done much better than Niger in terms of economic growth and democracy, some of its social indicators are worse than indicators for Niger. Especially worrying is the malnutrition level of children in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. (see Table 2).

High rates of child malnutrition are reflected in high mortality rates for West African children. These mortality rates have declined dramatically, but they remain too high. The high malnutrition and mortality rates in the CILSS countries reflect the precarious nature of food security related to declining and irregular Sahelian rainfall patterns. While the high rates in some of the coastal countries are often associated with civil strife, HIV/AIDS, on the other hand, tends to be a greater problem in the coastal states, than in the land locked countries.

Indicators related to infrastructure also reflect the lack of economic development. Per capita consumption of electrical power is highest in Ghana (275 kWh) where electricity is subsidized. But this is still only about 20% of the average for middle income countries. In Nigeria, the average is only 85 kWh/capita, or only about 30% of the average for low income countries. Telephone service throughout the region is difficult to acquire. Waiting periods are as high as 10 years and costs are high. Currently calls between the US and Mali are about \$3.00 per minute.

The road system is variable throughout the region. A normalized index produced by the World Bank shows the ratio of actual paved roads to expected paved roads. The coastal countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Guinea) are well endowed relative to their level of development, while the Sahelian countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger) are below expected or normalized levels. Road connections between interior and coastal countries are weak and transport costs are high, reflecting the colonial legacy.

The infrastructure indicators discussed above and available data on trade and investment show that regional and global integration have far to go in West Africa. Gross private capital flows into countries in the region and the number of internet connections describe a region with little global integration. If we take internet connections per 10,000 people in middle income countries as a standard (3.75 people connected per 10,000), then the region is weakly linked with no more than 2 connections per 100,000 people, and in most countries far less, or 0.20 people connected per 10,000.

These data reflect very low private investment in the region. Most investment is provided by foreign aid, which in 1997 represented between 10% and 15% of GNP in the ECOWAS countries – and generally 50% to 70% of gross domestic investment. It is probably not reasonable to assume that this aid has crowded-out the private sector because the investment environment. Gross private capital flows as a percent of GDP for 1997 (available for 8 countries) show significant declines since 1987 in 5 of the 8 countries. Nigeria has the highest flows but this fell from 9 % of GDP to 6.5% in 1997. Flows also fell in Senegal (from 2.4% to 1.4%) and by lesser amounts and from lower levels in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Niger. Private capital flows (% of Purchasing Power Parity to Gross Domestic Product) increased between 1987 and 1997 in Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, and Ghana, but remain at low levels (less than 1.5%, except Côte d'Ivoire at 4.3%). These data point to a major need for the region and this strategy – how to better integrate the region and its countries into the global economy. Total trade by the ECOWAS countries amounted to about 1.1% of the world total in 1970 and fell to 0.5% of the total in 1997, a record that must be improved if the region is to grow.

This brings the discussion back to trade and regional integration. Efforts are underway by UEMOA, ECOWAS and CILSS to improve the environment for both global and regional



trade. Intra-regional trade has improved in both the UEMOA and ECOWAS regions: for ECOWAS, from 2.9% of total export value in 1970 to 9.7% in 1997, and for UEMOA, from 6.6% in 1970 to 11% in 1997. However, these percentages have tended to remain somewhat flat since about 1980. By comparison with other trading blocks, there is a potential for much greater integration. In the EU, for example, 55% of the total value of exports is within the member countries, and in NAFTA, 49% of its total value of exports is within its member countries. These indicators point to great potential for increased economic growth and higher incomes in the region through trade development and enabling environment for investment.

**Table 3:**  
**Measures of Political and Economic Freedom and**  
**Real Economic Growth in West Africa - 1999**

Country	E C O W A S	U E M O A	C I L S S	GDP Per Capita Growth (1987 \$)  1975-97	Measures of Political and Economic Freedom				Euromoney Country credit- worthiness rating  September
					Freedom House			Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom	
					Political Freedom	Civil Liberty	Average		
					1999	1999	1999	1999	1998
Benin	X	X		0.7	71	71	71	39	8.4
Burkina Faso	X	X	X	2.1	29	43	36	30	20.5
Cameroon									
Cape Verde	X		X						
Chad			X	.03	14	43	29	24	6.2
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X		-1.2	14	43	29	33	30.3
Gambia, The	X		X	-0.1	0	29	15	28	9.2
Ghana	X			-0.2	57	57	57	40	29.4
Guinea	X			1.4	14	29	22	33	18.5
Guinea-Bissau	X	X	X	0.3	57	29	43	9	14.8
Liberia									
Mali	X	X	X	0.6	57	57	57	38	24.9
Mauritania	X		X	0.0	14	29	22	24	9.2
Niger	X	X	X	-1.7	0	29	15	26	10.9
Nigeria	X			-.05	14	43	29	34	17.2
Senegal	X	X	X	-.03	43	43	43	35	25.5
Sierra Leone	X			-2.2	57	29	43	19	11.3
Togo	X	X		-0.8	14	29	22	21	20.1
ECOWAS				-0.1	24	44	34	33	17.9
UEMOA				-0.1	31	44	38	32	19.4
ECOWAS				-0.1	20	43	32	34	15.8
CILSS				0.2	29	42	35	30	15.2
Middle income countries				NA	NA	NA	NA	41	36.7
High income countries				NA	100	100	100	100	91.3

Source: World Bank, and calculated from rankings by Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Data for Cape Verde (ECOWAS,CILSS) Chad (CILSS) and Liberia(ECOWAS) are not shown. Recent political events are not included and may change the ratings – for example Sierra Leone would rate much lower and Nigeria higher. Larger values indicate greater freedom or more positive credit rating.

Democracy and political stability have direct impact on economic growth and personal security. According to the Freedom House, the region has mixed results, with only Cape Verde, Ghana and Mali being considered to enjoy political and civil freedom. Seven of the remaining countries are considered “not free”, and the remainder, including Nigeria classified as “partially free.” In other words, the potential for political instability is relatively

high since only about 13% of the population in the region can be considered free. These factors are reflected by low creditworthiness, reduced external and internal investment, and low economic growth (see Table 3).

Political and civic freedoms have been shown to contribute to political stability and greater personal security. Food insecurity is associated with political instability, also a concern in politically stable countries. Demand for food aid is a proxy indicator of food insecurity and an area where the US plays a major role. One measure of success is that US contributions to food aid in the region, especially to the Sahel, have declined substantially in recent years. West Africa has an annual food production gap of some 5,500,000 metric tons per year. Annually, the region receives about 500,000 metric tons of food aid. US food aid assistance to West Africa has totaled over \$100 million annually since 1988, with Liberia accounting for approximately one-half of the total in most years. For 1999, food aid for the Sahel was 139,000 tons.

It is the coastal region with its greater agricultural potential, not the ecologically fragile Sahel, where slightly more than one-half of this food aid has been destined in recent years. Civil conflict, currently occurring in numerous rain-rich coastal countries, has produced over 2 million internally displaced persons and refugees who require substantial food aid. In contrast, the drought-prone Sahel region has not had a major emergency since 1984-85. To respond to the 1984-85 Sahelian drought, the US shipped some 400,000 metric tons of food aid. Should another disaster of this magnitude reoccur in West Africa, USAID assistance could fall far short of meeting the needs. The Club du Sahel and CILSS, through efforts at donor coordination and better early warning information systems, have been credited with improving the capacity to avert a major drought crisis.

## **Conclusion**

Major political, social and economic indicators for West Africa describe a region that is poor and not consistently improving. The natural resource base is deteriorating, corruption levels are high, and a large part of the population does not have access to safe water, adequate housing, job opportunities, sanitation, basic education or health care facilities. Political, civil and economic freedoms are below levels needed to assure political stability or lasting prosperity for the individuals in the region. Development in West Africa will progress at reasonable rates only if two fundamental conditions are met: (a) governance is significantly improved; and, (b) regional economic integration becomes a reality. Weak governance, the lack of transparency and accountability are key factors keeping West Africa poor. Among the most important of these factors are: political instability, capital scarcity, high transaction costs, low civic participation and low resource allocation to the social sectors. As a corollary, sustained progress in areas such as health, education, energy, food security, environmental protection and infrastructure will be impossible if these two basic conditions are not met. Promoting sustainable food security and natural resource management in a vulnerable region with marginal resource endowments will have a high pay-off relative to the alternatives. Regional and global integration and economic diversification must be improved before incomes can be expected to grow at levels needed to reduce poverty and assure political and economic stability

## **B. U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Relationship to Agency Goals**

Looking at the West Africa region, one is first struck by the high degree of turmoil and conflict. Manifestations of this are open warfare (Sierra Leone), non-democratic regimes promoting continued tensions; ethnic tensions/conflicts within countries; and countries which individually do not have the economic capacity or resource base to be competitive in the global economy. In this context, there has been and continues to be a high dependence on donor assistance. The high levels of corruption throughout all levels of society and institutions are contributing factors to the instability and conflicts.

West Africans recognize these factors and are working to change them. Stronger efforts at conflict resolution are being initiated. The recent attempts at resolution of the Guinea-Bissau conflict is a case in point. The resolution of the Tuareg situation in the Northern Sahel is another example. Recent events in Nigeria and Niger point to a willingness (though fragile) to return to a more democratic situation. Other countries, including Mali, Senegal, Benin and Cape Verde, continue to strengthen democratic governance.

With the possible exception of Nigeria, the West African countries recognize that they cannot perform individually in a global economy that is highly competitive. By working together, combining resources, and presenting larger markets, countries can become more competitive and attract new investment. Through investment, economic growth can be achieved, thereby helping to mitigate existing poverty conditions. As a consequence, many West African states are actively striving to create common economic institutions as well as common business legal structures.

Where does the United States fit into this picture? Does it have any significant interests in West Africa, as opposed to Eastern or Southern Africa? Could it not leave West Africa to the French, British, Portuguese, etc.? Building on historic ties to West Africa, the United States continues to have several strong interests in West Africa. Table 4 summarizes the relationship of the WARP Strategic Objectives with the USAID Agency Goals and U.S. National Interests as defined by the Strategic Plan for International Affairs Agencies (SPIA).

**Table 4:**

**USAID SO and SPIA National Interest Comparison**

<b>WARP Strategic Objective (SO)</b>	<b>USAID Goal</b>	<b>US National Interest (SPIA)</b>
<b>SO1: Regional economic integration Africa is strengthened in West Africa</b>	<b>Broad-based economic growth and agricultural development encouraged</b>	<b>Global Economic Prosperity, Expanding Markets</b>
<b>SO2: Increased, sustainable use of selected reproductive health, HIV/AIDS/STI and child survival services and/or products in West Africa.</b>	<b>World population stabilized and human health protected</b>	<b>Population and Health, AIDS Prevention</b>
<b>SO3: Food security and ENV/NRM policies and programs strengthened and implemented in West Africa.</b>	<b>The world's environment protected for long-term sustainability</b>	<b>Environment, Global Climate Change</b>
<b>SPO: Early detection and response mechanisms to prevent regional conflicts established and functioning.</b>	<b>Democracy and good governance strengthened</b>	<b>Democracy and Human Rights, Regional Political Stability</b>

While each of the WARP Strategic and Special Objectives will be developed individually, there is a basic recurrent and underlying interest - regional stability. With regional stability, both democratic and economic growth can take place. Without that stability, not much will emerge that will build a better quality of life for the people of West Africa.

How can such stability be achieved? Long term stability depends upon alleviation of poverty and providing revenue avenues for the population. In this context, West Africa must see alternative means of access to both wealth and power.

However, there are the continuous short-term conflicts that threaten to destabilize large parts of the region. Examples include: the current Casamance Region of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia conflicts which threaten Guinea (Conakry), the Gambia and all of Senegal. In such situations different relationships and a set of actions will be necessary on a short-term basis.

For either case, long term or short term, the continued stability of the region (both politically and economically) is the platform from which a strategy can be launched.

Stability brings to mind a double-stranded DNA helix--it has both political and economic strands that are inextricably intertwined. The political side implies a peaceful means of resolving conflict through stable and reliable institutions and respect for the rule of law. The economic side implies stable and predictable economic opportunities for the population. The lack of political stability promotes economic instability. Lack of both economic certainty and opportunities, promotes chaos and inequalities which can lead to political instability and/or dictatorship.

Choosing this overarching theme, it can then serve as a filter for developing a meaningful strategy that will help rationalize the AID approach to West Africa, both on a regional and bilateral level.

### **C. Development Opportunities and Challenges in West Africa**

New opportunities to help regional actors accelerate social, political and economic development are key to the success of regional integration. West Africans themselves are responsible for opening the door to many of these new opportunities. Most countries are again led by democratically elected leaders, with Nigeria, the regional giant, having rejoined these ranks only in 1999.

There is a growing concern over the need for conflict prevention mechanisms in the region and a number of leaders are supporting actions, such as small arms registration, as a means of reducing the potential for conflict and violence. This is an area where USAID can provide useful assistance.

Most countries have chosen market-oriented economic approaches and have made some, if uneven, strides to further liberalizing their economies. Leaders are realizing the need for common action to confront the challenge of the globalization of the economy. They are open to assistance to improving their capacity to trade in the global economy and, as in the case of the UEMOA countries, are moving resolutely towards economic integration. Countries in the region have also begun to restructure priorities to reduce public interference with private actors in the productive sectors and instead invest in the underlying public infrastructure and human capital of their economies. One example of this is the recent decision of the ECOWAS countries to move towards the creation of a regional power pool that would rely heavily on private sector investment, management and ownership. USAID is well situated to provide the technical resources and training needed as liberalization and privatization occur.

West Africans are taking the lead in their regional development. They are defining the agenda, devising solutions and implementing them successfully through cooperative efforts throughout the region. A growing number of institutions and networks in West Africa are improving their vision, clarifying their mandates, and strengthening their management and organizational capacity to better address the development challenges.

At the September 1999 Yverdon Conference of the Club du Sahel, it was proposed by the ministerial group that the Heads of State of the West African countries consider a reorientation and division of responsibilities among the three regional organizations (ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS). Their proposal, which is likely to gain acceptance, would assign food security and environmental management responsibilities to CILSS, macro-economic and structural reforms to UEMOA, and political integration and security responsibilities to ECOWAS. The proposal will be on the agenda for the "Bamako 2000" West African Heads of State meeting to be held in Bamako in November 2000. The regional institutions are attempting to establish new, more productive ways of collaborating in the development of West Africa. USAID must build on these cooperative efforts through critical partnerships with public and private organizations, institutions and networks that have demonstrated their vision and capacity.

Regional actions add value to the development process in ways that cannot come from efforts undertaken at the national levels. At the same time, however, it is important to point out that

individual country programs can and do make important contributions to regional development. For decades, USAID operated in West Africa with a mix of strong bilateral programs and limited regional activities. In recent years, however, the Africa Bureau has closed bilateral Missions in nine West African countries, leaving a greatly diminished capacity to implement an effective and coherent regional program at precisely the moment of great opportunity. In West Africa, USAID now has sustainable development missions in only five countries— Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Benin and Guinea – and transition country programs in two – Nigeria and Liberia.

In the other fifteen countries covered by the USAID AFR/WA geographic office; and with the exception of SRP and FHA, AID funding is limited to humanitarian assistance, PL 480 programs, some 116e and Special self-help funding, with some broader Africa-wide or worldwide programs implemented by the Sustainable Development Office of the Africa Bureau (AFR/SD) or the Global Bureau. With this Strategic Plan, USAID is refocusing its attention on the West Africa region and proposing a more coherent, integrated program to assist West Africans to accelerate development for a more stable and prosperous region.

Through targeted, policy oriented activities, the WARP can effectively work with regional groups to help close the gap.

In developing this strategy, analytical work directed the RST toward five regionally critical areas where West Africa's current needs and developmental opportunities coincide with USAID's comparative advantages. These are:

- Fostering democratic governance in West Africa;
- Promoting regional economic integration;
- Stabilizing population and improving health;
- Improving food security and environmental management; and
- Preventing regional conflicts.

## **D. Strategy Integration and Cross-Cutting Themes**

Four of the five program areas in the West Africa Regional Program form the core of the Strategic Objectives. A fifth Special Objective, democratic governance, will cut across all of the Strategic Objectives and integrated throughout the strategy. The program proposed builds upon the institutional foundations and programmatic successes of the Family Health and HIV/AIDS Activity (FHA) and the Sahel Regional Program (SRP), and also seeks to take advantage of opportunities in West African trade and investment, regional energy integration and conflict detection.

Although there have been dramatic advances in recent years in the establishment of democratic governmental systems in some of the countries of West Africa, these improvements remain scattered, incomplete and fragile. Considerable effort and resources must be devoted to strengthening democratic processes and institutions in West Africa, in the absence of which development assistance programs in the region cannot achieve long-term sustainability. Indeed, the Diagnostics Report,<sup>6</sup> concludes that without significantly improved governance, in its many forms and processes, economic, social and political development in West Africa will not proceed at a reasonable rate.

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<sup>6</sup> See bibliography for Diagnostic Report references.

Five common themes emerged as cross-cutting governance issues throughout the Regional Strategy document.

These cross-cutting themes include: (1) widespread and ongoing efforts to decentralize and the attendant need to build local capacity; (2) the need for strong and efficiently functioning civil society organizations to serve as advocates and participants in change; (3) the importance of information-sharing, among governmental institutions at all levels and the citizenry they serve, as well as through public communications channels, such as the media; (4) the need to develop participatory policy reform and implementation procedures; and (5) the requirement for transparency of process and accountability of public, private and voluntary institutions.

The Regional Strategy Team has concluded that an effective approach to furthering nascent democratic institutions and promoting good governance is to include the above principles as integral parts of each Strategic Objective, rather than to create a stand-alone Democratic Governance Strategic Objective. To clearly demonstrate the ways in which these cross-cutting themes are reflected throughout the regional strategy, a matrix illustrating the application of these democratic governance themes across the Results Framework is presented below in table 5.

Additional elements which underline the integration of democratic governance throughout the regional strategy are the opportunities for joint programming and training, as well as by the identification of common techniques, program implementation methodologies, and best practices that can be applied and shared across strategic sectors.

**Table 5 :**  
**RELATIONSHIPS AMONG WEST AFRICA REGIONAL PROGRAM**  
**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (SOs) & SPECIAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (SPO)**  
**AND ELEMENTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE**

<b>ELEMENTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE</b>	<b>SO1</b>	<b>SO2</b>	<b>SO3</b>	<b>SPO</b>
Decentralization	IR1.1 IR1.4	IR2.1	IR.3.3	IR2
Advocacy	IR1.1 IR1.2	IR2.2	IR3.3	IR2
Info Sharing	IR1.1 IR1.2	IR2.1 IR2.3 IR2.4 IR2.5	IR3.1 IR3.2 IR3.3	IR1 IR2 IR3 IR4
Policy Development & Implementation	IR1.1 IR1.3	IR2.1 IR2.2 IR2.4 IR2.5	IR3.3	IR1 IR3
Transparency	IR1.1	IR2.3	IR3.3	IR1 IR2

To retain a permanent focus on incorporating democratic governance within the sectoral programs, and to provide a platform on which information-sharing can take place, the RST plans to create an ongoing dialogue with relevant partners. This dialogue will serve to review progress toward objectives, to discuss joint programming opportunities including those to

enhance gender equity through democracy and governance initiatives, and to share other pertinent information.

Women's participation in the economies of the West African region have evolved over time since independence. However, traditional women's roles, their legal status, their access to resources, and their participation in the political arena remain limited. Throughout most of the region women can vote, have full legal rights over their property, can own businesses, and can engage in private enterprise. However, these rights are often contradicted by tradition which regulate the status of women in the family and is based on religious and cultural norms.

In urban areas, women have access to wage-earning jobs in many businesses and professions, although they continue to occupy the lowest grades of the private and public sectors. In the private sector, women work in traditional economic activities such as textiles and domestic and personal services. Rural women are the most disadvantaged segment and are subject to greater socio-cultural constraints than urban women. Though women are major contributors to agricultural production, most women do not work on a wage basis. Traditional patterns of work devalue domestic work because it is traditionally non-cash and non-market. Where wage earning does occur for women, often times it is unrecorded and not fully understood, and yet plays a significant role in cross border trade and the movement of goods in the region.

When school attendance rates for girls increase, and general literacy rates for women rise, infant mortality rates decline, overall family health increases and the impact on the economies is positive.

The WARP strategy will integrate women's participation in each of its SO s and SPO as a crosscutting theme.

## **E. Overview of Other Actors**

### **West African Partners**

In the West African region, individual nation-states have long recognized the advantages of regional cooperation. Some are visionary and foresee integration along the lines of the European Union, while others are pragmatic and cooperate regionally when national policy objectives are best met this way. Regionalism is not seen as an end in itself, but, rather a means of improving GDP, political stability, and reducing common threats. Hence, regionalism helps achieve an economy of scale, or becomes the means of applying peer pressure in issues like political stability.

A measure of the political commitment to regional cooperation is the viability of the mechanisms by which the individual states cooperate. Whether the mechanism is an organization that enjoys sufficient financial and human resources to fulfill its mandate, or an agreement, treaty or framework for action among certain states, viability is defined in term of results that mark progress toward long-term development objectives thought best achieved regionally, rather than bilaterally.

West Africans therefore invest in different mechanisms for regional cooperation. These include, in addition to ECOWAS, UEMOA, OHADA and CILSS (discussed in sections IA and IC), the West African Enterprise Network (WAEN), the West African Monetary



Authority (WAMA) and the West African Development Bank (BOAD – *Banque Ouest-Africaine de Developpement*). There is a wealth of networks and professional associations, as well, such as the *Conférence des Ministres de l'Agriculture de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre (CMA/AOC)*, the *Union des Producteurs et Distributeurs d'Electricite en Afrique (UPDEA)*, the *Association des Professionnels des Banques et Etablissements Financiers* and the *Organisation de Coordination et de Cooperation pour la lutte contre les Grandes Epidemies (OCCGE)*.

An example of a treaty is the OHADA treaty, which has three main objectives: 1) to harmonize the business law of Member States by adopting uniform acts; 2) to ensure effective settlement of disputes arising from the application of uniform acts and 3) to provide advanced training to magistrates and legal staff. Presently the OHADA signatory countries, which include only Francophone countries in West and Central Africa), are taking steps to implement the treaty. These include the establishment of institutions, such as the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, which will be responsible for implementing the treaty provisions.

An example of an existing framework is the “Sub-Regional Action Plan (SRAP) to Combat Desertification in West Africa and Chad,” stipulated under the UN International Convention to Combat Desertification. Another example is the Livestock Action Plan, a loose coalition of six West African states whose purpose is to reduce trade barriers in livestock marketing in the central corridor states.

### **Other Donor Partners**

Donor assistance accounts for approximately nine percent of the aggregate GDP of the West African countries. Of this amount, approximately half derives from multilateral sources and half from bilateral. The principal multilateral sources include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UN agencies and the European Union (EU). USAID ranks fourth as a bilateral donor in the West Africa region, behind France, Germany, and Japan. Assistance levels by France are approximately seven times the U.S. level, and those of Germany and Japan approximately four times, and three and one-half times U.S. levels, respectively. Following USAID, the largest bilateral donors in the region are the Netherlands and Canada. Donors responded with increased country-by-country (as distinct from regional) assistance to individual West African states as the region slid into deep recession in the early 1980s. In current dollars, all donor assistance increased from \$2.2 billion in 1980, to \$5.8 billion in 1995.

If donor assistance is analyzed in terms of substance, rather than volume, a different construct of the principal partners in regional initiatives emerges. The EU has allocated 80 per cent of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> tranches of the European Development Fund in West Africa to support regional integration. This is on the order of \$500 - \$800 million per year. Although the bulk of the resources are committed bilaterally, they are programmed toward the achievement of overarching regional objectives. A small amount of the EU resources for West Africa is allocated to support of regional institutions, including ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS. The French provide strong support to UEMOA, in the interest of sustaining the FCFA (*Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine* currency). The six principal bilateral donors to CILSS (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.S.) share an interest in regional food security and regional natural resources management. The Bretton Woods institutions are nearly exclusively focused on bilateral assistance, and provide very little support to

regional objectives or regional institutions, although there has been consideration of partnering with the EU in support of a cross-border trade initiative, similar to that in East and Southern Africa.

## II. PROPOSED STRATEGY

As stated in the introduction, the goal of the West Africa Regional Program (WARP) is “a politically stable and economically prosperous West Africa”. This is a 20-25 year goal, and clearly must be achieved through the contributions of all the partners in the West African regional development endeavor. Indicators of progress are to be derived from the macro-level economic, political and social indicators discussed in Section I.A, “Macro-Economic, Political and Social Trends.”


The three SOs and one SPO selected by the Governing Board for inclusion in the WARP are steps along the way to the goal. The WARP has an eight-year timeframe, but recognizes the long-term goal will take 20 or more years to achieve. USAID’s assistance will be more effective if it capitalizes on the momentum of the West Africans themselves. At present, this momentum appears in different geographic configurations within each SO focus area. Because of the uneven progress in the region while the strategy maintains the long-term goal of regional integration, it is recognized that the concept of “variable geography” or the understanding that not all countries are moving at the same pace, must be kept in mind.

Thus defined, the WARP will: (1) address particular problems on a cross-border basis; (2) involve regional institutions in the implementation of its interventions and ; (3) ensure that personnel employed in the WARP activities understand that they are operating regionally, and apply a regional perspective in their work. In this context, the term “regional value-added” refers to situations where action, interaction or change at the regional level strengthens or adds value to development efforts undertaken at the national levels. For example, obstacles to cross-border trade cannot be resolved by one country alone. Regional action adds value to the development process which cannot come from a source other than at the regional level.

In each SO and SPO area, the countries that are ready to advance toward integration differ. All West African countries are not moving in lock step toward total integration. To illustrate this point, the Sahelian countries have successfully developed mechanisms to avert a human crisis stemming from the serious risk of drought. In recognition of the success of CILSS, it has been proposed to serve as the lead agency within the entire region on issues of food security and NRM. Similarly, the UEMOA has proceeded rapidly toward the economic as well as monetary integration of its member states and is seen as the lead regional agency on such matters, even by non-member countries. The variable geography concept is found elsewhere in other regions that are integrating. A salient and recent example is the adoption of the Euro among the European Union member countries. It is a useful concept to allow progress to be made but allowing flexibility for more hesitant states to participate at a later date.

Monitoring within each SO and SPO area will demonstrate how progress is being made toward integration, and whether that is an effective strategy toward achieving the goal of a politically stable and economically prosperous West Africa.

Figure I: Strategic and Special Objectives



## **A. Strategic Objective 1**

### **Regional economic integration strengthened in West Africa**

#### **A.1 Problem Statement**

The sixteen ECOWAS countries of West Africa have shared a vision of national economies integrated into a regional system since independence. However, in most cases, this vision has not transformed into sustainable, growth enhancing programs. West Africa remains one of the least developed socially and one of the poorest regions in the world, with poverty rates as high as 50% with as many as 80% of the poor living in rural areas. With the exception of Nigeria, national markets in West Africa are too small to support scale-sensitive industry. The agricultural sector, frequently considered to represent significant potential for growth in the region, is under-productive, because of the lack of investment, poor management resulting from state control, irregular rainfall, and a degraded natural resource base. West Africa suffers also from inefficiencies in the supply and pricing of energy, roads and telecommunication. Traditional trading practices, the types and volumes of goods traded, and current trading routes are not suited to either a regional nor a global economy. This has resulted in stagnant or slower growth than countries elsewhere on this continent.

However, the long-term economic trends have recently begun to improve, in part, because of the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. Benefits from structural adjustment programs and private investment in the countries in the region have also contributed to the improvement in the economic trends in the region. While improvement in the investment levels and the economic rate of growth is increasing, it still lags below other developing regions with higher degrees of integration, and below levels required for sustainable growth and poverty reduction or eradication. During the exploratory phases of this strategy, findings of both the diagnostics papers on energy and regional economic integration<sup>7</sup> provided validation for the basic premise of the WARP: If the countries of West Africa hope to simulate and maintain economic growth at the levels needed to increase household incomes, the countries must work together within a regional framework. This was further developed during a round table held with the various economic development groups at the conceptual stages of the WARP<sup>8</sup>. Regional economic integration can provide the West African states with the necessary conditions for attracting private investment and stimulating domestic markets and cross-border trade.

#### **A.2 Strategic Objective for Regional Economic Integration**

The problems in the West Africa region stem not so much from the absence of donor programs addressing these constraints, but rather that these efforts are not comprehensive nor integrated and therefore inadequate on their own. One illustrative example is where donor assistance is provided to the three primary regional institutions (i.e. ECOWAS, UEMOA, CILSS), but the assistance is not structured in such a way as to encourage interaction, collaboration and a logical division of responsibilities between them enabling the resources to go further by avoiding duplication. SO 1 will work toward filling this need through

<sup>7</sup> See Annex I, *Regional Economic Integration*, May 7, 1999 and Annex II, *West Africa Regional Energy Sector*, May 7, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> A Roundtable was held in April 1999 in Accra, Ghana to solicit the knowledge and perspectives of various non governmental organizations in the region, in addition to public and private sector, and donor input.

supporting fora at which these organizations can discuss and formulate a common agenda for regional economic integration in both the public and private sectors. Priority areas addressed by this SO include the removal of barriers and impediments to trade, such as a lack of standardized banking and accounting practices, uniform customs procedures; inefficient and unreliable energy systems; restrictive trade and investment policies; and a lack of transparency in all transactions.

The diagnostic studies and roundtables with African leaders that preceded the development of this strategy identified a range of activities that USAID could undertake to support and reinforce efforts at regional economic integration<sup>9</sup>. Given the limited resources and staff of the WARP not all proposals could be included in the WARP. In determining which possible activities should be undertaken by the WARP to support regional economic integration, the following selection criteria were employed:

Each activity must:

- have African ownership and commitment;
- involve issues and countries of significant interest to the United States;
- offer the potential for high economic and/or political payoffs;
- have the interest and support of the donor community;
- provide value-added to the programs of the USAID bilateral missions;
- have the interest and support of other US government agencies; and,
- have the interest and support of the US private sector .

Several cross-cutting themes were incorporated into the selection process because of their importance to sustaining economic development. Hence, SO1 will make a special effort to ensure that small-scale and women entrepreneur/traders in the informal sector are included in efforts to promote business linkages.

Gendered patterns of participation in trade also influence the ways in which men and women are differentially impacted by trade policies and processes of liberalization. With the expansion of USAID-supported programs for trade liberalization, greater efforts will be made to understand women's participation in trade as well as impacts of trade policies on women. Transparency and democratic governance are two other necessary components to be included when removing impediments to trade. Those affected by changes in the laws and regulations governing trade must be given a voice in the decision-making process. SO1 will also integrate individuals from various parts of civil society in West Africa to participate in consultations, dialogue and information sharing on and/or about economic development issues. This will help to build real African participation and leadership in the development agenda and to strengthen the political will of governments to implement programs developed by, or with, civil society.

While WARP will work with civil society groups in the private sector, it will also support regional public sector institutions that are designed in such a way as to promote cooperation and dialogue in the areas of trade and investment in West Africa. In particular ECOWAS, UEMOA, CILSS and OHADA will be the focus of the SO1 interaction. As the largest and broadest regional institution in West Africa, ECOWAS adopted a number of protocols governing trade, banking and energy. Most of the protocols have yet to be implemented,

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<sup>9</sup> See bibliography for a complete listing.

however the WARP will provide support to ECOWAS for implementation of some of these protocols. Additionally the WARP will assist ECOWAS and UEMOA in their efforts to establish a West Africa Power Pool (WAPP). It is anticipated that working with WAPP will be one of the most important and fastest moving elements of the WARP.

The success of SO1 will depend extensively on the ability of the WARP to develop collaborative efforts with other donors engaged in regional economic integration in West Africa. The primary donors presently involved are the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union, and the French Development Agency. With the exception of the AfDB, located in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, the donors manage their regional programs out of their headquarters offices. Donor coordination will present a major challenge for the WARP as no mechanism presently exists at the regional level. This issue is discussed in more detail under Section IV.C. on donor coordination.

Measurement of progress towards achieving the SO will be carried out by monitoring the following indicators and targets:

- Percent of total trade that is intra-regional increased from 10% to 25% by 2008; and
- Regional electrical energy demand deficits reduced by 25% by 2008.

### **A.3 Intermediate Results**

#### **IR 1.1: Intra-regional barriers to trade reduced.**

Barriers to trade have been identified by business people in both the formal and informal sectors as a major impediment to trade in West Africa. Barriers to trade are both institutional (formal) and illicit (informal). One example of formal barriers to trade are high duties on imported goods and, an example of informal barriers to trade is the payment of bribes for goods or services. The growth of the informal sector over the past several years can, in large part, be attributed to these barriers, which in turn means that a large part of business activity takes place in an arena where access to credit, training and legal recourse is not possible. This also has a more insidious effect – because these barriers weaken market linkages which are needed to interact to generate exports and income growth. In the end, this means that especially high rates of economic growth are needed to achieve any meaningful reduction in poverty.

IR 1.1 inherits a number of activities that are being funded by the SRP and the ATRIP, but will also add new activities, subject to the availability of funding, to promote intra-regional trade.<sup>10</sup> New activities which show the greatest potential for rapid results will be given priority if funding is limited. Priority areas addressed by this SO include the removal of impediments to free trade, such as a lack of standardized banking and accounting practices, uniform customs procedures; inefficient and unreliable energy systems; restrictive trade and investment policies; and a lack of transparency in all business transactions.

#### **Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) At least half of West African national governments take actions to eliminate illicit taxes and trade control points.

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<sup>10</sup> The SRP is authorized through FY2001 and is funded at approximately \$7m/year.

- 2) Illicit taxes and illegal trade control points are being monitored and reported on by regional institutions in half of the West African countries by 2008.
- 3) West African countries implement existing regional protocols and agreements relating to free movement of people and goods.
- 4) Regional institutions and associations are conducting public education programs to inform West Africans of their rights of trade and movement under existing regional protocols, treaties and agreements.

### **Illustrative Activities Include:**

#### Legacy activities from existing programs (funding source and implementing organization):

- Forum of West Africa (FOWA) dialogue for the purpose of rationalizing the numerous Inter-Governmental Organizations in the region, creating coherence between bilateral and regional agendas of donors, and addressing regional tensions in the region (SRP-funded: CILSS, UEMOA, ECOWAS, WAEN);
- West Africa Livestock Action Plan (SRP-funded: CILSS);
- West Africa Enterprise Network (SRP-funded: WAEN); and,
- Commercial Law Development Program (ATRIP-funded: Commerce Department)

#### New proposed activities include:

- FOWA trade impediments monitoring and reporting system (FOWA, WAEN);
- Making OHADA more participatory (OHADA, UEMOA);
- Bridging OHADA's anglophone-francophone legal divide (OHADA, UNIDA, ABA);
- Internet marketing and trade development (WAEN): and,
- West Africa Businesswomen's Forum (WAEN and others).

### **IR 1.2: Improved dialogue and coordination on trade policies among West African countries.**

African leadership is essential to determining effective policy and designing programs that address critical issues currently inhibiting trade and investment in West Africa. This leadership can only occur and be maintained if stakeholders are intimately associated with the process. The types of activities contemplated under this IR are not capital intensive, and it is anticipated if funding becomes limited, all activities will still be supported at a reduced funding and staffing level.

#### **Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) Percent of local formal and informal business who are aware of and understand OHADA increased to x %.
- 2) Regional institutions and associations hold semi-annual meetings to discuss global and regional trade issues.
- 3) Mechanisms for the exchange of information on U.S.-Africa trade and investment opportunities are increased by 25%.



**Illustrative activities include:**Legacy activities from existing programs:

US-Africa Business linkages (ATRIP-funded: Corporate Council on Africa, WAEN).

New proposed activities include:

- Improving civil society participation in trade policy development (FOWA);
- World Trade Organization policy and negotiation training seminars (WAEN, ECOWAS, UEMOA);
- Donor coordination on private sector programs (World Bank, AfDB, EU).

**IR 1.3: Improved harmonization of regional monetary and fiscal policies by West African countries.**

People engaged in business activities in the formal or informal sectors have identified cross-border money transfers and inconsistent implementation of taxes and duties as a primary impediment to intra-regional trade and investment. This IR will continue and extend current efforts to improve the application of monetary and fiscal policy in the region.

If WARP financial resources are limited, this IR will receive minimal funding as there does not exist any present commitment for most of the activities.

**Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) Timetable and action plan established for unification of West African currencies.
- 2) Use of ECOWAS travelers checks increases by 10% annually by 2008.
- 3) Time required to achieve cross-border monetary transfers reduced by 100% by 2008.

**Illustrative activities include:**Legacy activities from existing programs include:

- Dialogue on practical solutions to the problems of cross-border monetary transfers (SRP-funded: WAEN).

New proposed activities include:

- Support for dialogue on financial sector supervision and reform (UEMOA, WAMA, ECOWAS, WAEN);
- Support for efforts to improve regional taxation policies and systems (UEMOA, ECOWAS, WAEN).
- Support for efforts to broaden and deepen capital markets (both equity and debt markets) and expand the range of available financial instruments for the private sector (UEMOA, WAMA, WAEN, ECOWAS);
- Support for dialogue on a broader West African monetary union (UEMOA, ECOWAS, WAMA, WAEN);

#### **IR 1.4: Improved regional institutional capacity to provide sustainable and competitively priced supply of energy.**

Economic growth in West Africa is impeded by the lack of adequate infrastructure. Most notable is the lack of infrastructure in the roadways, telecommunications and energy sectors. While the problems of transportation and telecommunications are being effectively addressed by the donor community, the energy sector has received less attention, though West Africa suffers from serious inefficiencies in the generation, transmission, distribution and consumption of energy. The lack of reasonably priced reliable energy inhibits economic development and industrial growth. Furthermore, a lack of investment capital discourages the expansion and modernization of the existing system. In addition, the system maintenance and rehabilitation is inhibited by management policies and practices that inadequately set prices for the power, delaying the issuance and collection of service charges, and that impedes system planning and administration.

The WARP will assist the ECOWAS countries to develop a private sector led dynamic energy sector that feeds power to an efficiently managed West African power grid. The WARP is committed to collaborating with ECOWAS countries to ensure the availability of reasonably priced, reliable energy supplies that will contribute to industrial growth, employment generation and increased productivity. Through the Union of African Electricity Producers and Distributors (UPDEA), the WARP will provide technical assistance and training to the electrical utilities of the region. A key element of this I.R. is the participation of domestic and foreign private sector investors in the financing, construction and management of the regional energy transmission systems. Because of its potentially high political and economic payoffs and the high level of interest by the US private sector, the gas pipeline and power pool activities of this IR will be given high priority for funding under this SO by the WARP.

#### **Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) Regional energy regulatory body established and functioning;
- 2) Regional energy demand deficits reduced by xx% by 2008; and
- 3) Trans-national energy sales grow by xx% annually to 2008.

#### **Illustrative activities include:**

##### Legacy activities from existing programs include:

- Development of the West Africa Gas Pipeline (ATRIP-funded: ECOWAS); and,
- Purdue University WAPP power pool modeling exercise (ATRIP-funded: ECOWAS, UEMOA).


##### New proposed activities include:

- Development of the West Africa Power Pool (ECOWAS, UEMOA);
- Training to increase institutional capacity in the energy sector particularly where such training supports the development of the transnational gas pipeline and the establishment of the WAPP (ECOWAS, UEMOA, UPDEA);
- Support for the development of the administrative, regulatory, and policy requirements for the regional energy network. Such activities include preparation of inter-governmental agreements, the inter-utility memorandum of understanding,

operating and tariff agreements, technical standards, communications and payment procedures, policies, laws and regulations, management procedures and systems as well as private sector concessions (ECOWAS, UEMOA, UPDEA);

- Support for effective regional energy demand management (ECOWAS, UEMOA, UPDEA);
- Regional standardization and improvement of billing and collection procedures (ECOWAS, UPDEA, WAEN);
- Support for the establishment of public utility commissions with representation for consumer and business groups (ECOWAS, UEMOA, UPDEA, WAEN);
- Support for the development of regulatory frameworks and technical norms for access by independent power producers to the regional energy grid (ECOWAS, UEMOA, UPDEA, WAEN);
- Support for the development of regional utility operating standards (ECOWAS, UDEA); and
- Support for the creation of a regional energy efficiency rating system for electrical motors, tools and appliances (ECOWAS, UPDEA, WAEN).

**Figure II: SO1 for Regional Economic Integration**



## **2. Strategic Objective 2**

Increased sustainable use of selected reproductive health\*, HIV/AIDS-STI, and child survival services and/or products in West Africa

\* defined here to include family planning and maternal health

### **B.1 Problem Statement**

The West Africa region is plagued with some of the worst overall health indicators in the world. While the region is making progress toward political pluralism, economic liberalization, and sustainable growth, political institutions and social delivery services remain fragile with limited capacity to address the health issues faced by the region. The issues affecting the health status of the region include specific disease areas coupled with cross cutting human resources and institutional problems.

The major health problems in the region include HIV/AIDS (while rates are lower than in East & Southern Africa, rates are increasing in a number of countries); high infant and child mortality (among the highest in the world); high maternal mortality (20% of annual world-wide maternal deaths occur in West & Central Africa), and the low use of modern contraceptives (West Africa has the highest fertility and lowest contraceptive prevalence rates in Africa). Numerous factors contribute to these specific health problems including weak service delivery capacity of public and private sector organizations, poor quality of services when delivered, lack of client and provider knowledge of overall health practices, and fragmented planning and programming of resources on the part of governments and donors.

### **B.2 Strategic Objective**

In order to address the serious health problems and constraints SO2 will focus on increasing sustainable use of selected reproductive health, STI/HIV/AIDS, and child survival services and/or products in West Africa. This SO will focus on addressing the constraints of poor service delivery performance, limited technical and management leadership in the health sector, lack of knowledge of best practices and state of the art technologies, fragmented use of public and private sector financial and human resources. Within this context, the SO will focus on specific health problems including HIV/AIDS high rates of maternal mortality, reversals in child survival trends and low contraceptive prevalence. USAID will use its comparative advantage to complement other ongoing donor activities with its particular technical expertise in advocacy and policy dialogue, capacity building and training, operations research, IEC, social marketing and logistics management. USAID will use this expertise to leverage and mobilize additional resources for health within the region.

Progress towards achieving the SO will be measured by monitoring the following indicators:

- Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (modern methods) among all women of reproductive age — Weighted Average;
- Condom use among last non-regular sexual partner — Weighted Average;

- Percent of children age 12-23 months fully immunized by one year of age (BCG, measles, DPT3, and Polio3);
- Number of countries participating in cross-border HIV/AIDS interventions;
- Organizational development of regional African partner institutions; and
- Level of financing mobilized from sources other than USAID for expanding access to quality services in the region.

### **B.3 Intermediate Results**

#### **IR 2.1: Increased access to quality reproductive health, HIV/AIDS-STI and child survival services and/or products.**

To address limited access and poor quality of services as well as limited access to information by both consumers and providers, this IR will focus on achievement of results at two levels. The first is from interventions implemented in the non-presence countries that focus on people-level impact, such as contraceptive prevalence. Outcomes at this level include successful demonstration interventions, refined technical tools to further expand and improve the quality of care, successful marketing projects undertaken by partner NGOs and public sector organizations, applied research and the demonstration of successful technical leadership in the design and implementation of interventions. The second set of outcomes are expected from the regional activities that focus on issues and opportunities that cut across national borders such as cross-border HIV/AIDS prevention activities, pre-service and in-service training, operations research and networking (South-to-south technical exchanges) which disseminate important lessons learned and best practices throughout the region.

#### **Achievement of this IR will be measured by:**

- 1) Couple years of protection in four target non-presence countries;
- 2) Number of training institutions adopting revised curriculum across the region;
- 3) New approaches and products tested and adopted in the region; and
- 4) Number of countries participating in cross-border HIV/AIDS interventions.

Support for regional activities is based on increasing economies of scale, focus on priority problems that cut across national borders, and increased efficient use of regional resources, e.g. sharing of training and IEC materials. Experience with the FHA project has demonstrated that these approaches can improve access to, demand for, and quality of services through USAID's areas of comparative advantage, including social marketing, introduction of new technologies and services at existing service delivery points, logistics management and supervision, expanding service availability through leveraging of other donor funding, etc. Strategies will include interventions in both the public and private sector, the use of both formal and informal information channels for behavioral change interventions, and targeting hard-to-reach and high-risk groups with life-saving information. Special attention will be given to designing and testing models for creating cross-sector linkages between health and civil society.

Given the escalating prevalence of the HIV/AIDS in the West Africa region, every effort will be made to reach vulnerable groups such as women and youth with HIV/AIDS prevention messages. Additionally, a special effort will be undertaken to aggressively promote advocacy in support of multi-sector and regional level mobilization of resources for carrying out HIV/AIDS interventions.

Given the reversal in child survival trends in the region, SO2 will explore for expanded involvement, on a regional basis, in child survival activities. These may include increased support for vaccination programs in the region, maternal and neonatal health care activities, malaria prevention and control programs, and expanded work under the Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) initiative. A major area of emphasis for child survival will be the promotion of sustainable routine immunization services. In response to the high morbidity and mortality of children under five caused by diarrheal disease, USAID has promoted the use of oral rehydration salts (ORS) in the four FHA focus countries through a social marketing program. The SO will assess the impact and feasibility of scaling up of this activity and based on this review, the distribution of Orasel, the regional brand, will be continued.

Some illustrative activities that will be continued and/or expanded for increasing access to quality services are the following:

**Regional activities:**

- Cross-border HIV/AIDS-STI activities building social marketing techniques and focusing on highly mobile populations such as long-distance truck drivers, commercial sex workers and seasonal migrant labors;
- Transnational IEC campaigns which disseminate messages, pamphlets, videos, brochures, posters or other tools for reinforcing positive behavioral change, especially around HIV/AIDS-STI prevention and control;
- Pre-service regional initiative involving key training institutions in the region including advocacy for curriculum change and new curriculum development.
- In-service training at the regional and national levels focusing on selected areas such as logistic management, IEC and organization of health services; and
- Expanding the product line of social marketing programs in the region.

**In “non-presence” countries:**

- Developing and implementing standards, protocols and tools for improving quality of care;
- Developing and implementing management information system for documenting performance and improving decision making;
- Developing and implementing supervision and counseling approaches and tools for integrated delivery of services building on the minimal package of care;
- Leveraging other partner resources for scaling up tested tools and approaches as well as follow-up of regional activities at the country level.

**IR 2.2: Increased effective advocacy for action in HIV/AIDS, maternal health and child survival**

This IR will focus on the use of traditional and innovative advocacy methods to increase the flow of information and engage government policy makers, civil society, local government and religious leaders, and the private sector to adopt strategies, policies, behaviors and practices leading to the achievement of the SO. Advocacy is particularly important for moving the HIV/AIDS and maternal health agenda in WA at the highest political levels as

well as with civil society and local leaders to mobilize resources and community actions to address problems. Of particular concern is the reversal of trends in child survival indicators such as immunization coverage and infant and child mortality. This need to be brought to the attention of the government leaders, civil society and donors reviews of the trends and strategy for action.

**Achievement of this IR will be measured by:**

- 1) Regional strategy for HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation adopted;
- 2) Regional strategy for maternal health adopted;
- 3) Regional strategy child survival adopted; and
- 4) Number of other sector forums (e.g. labor, economic growth, agriculture) putting HIV/AIDS on their agenda.

**Illustrative activities:**

- Development of regional advocacy strategies for action with WA partners for problems such as HIV/AIDS, maternal health, and malaria, etc;
- Capacity building of African institutions including CERPOD and organizations to undertake more effective advocacy;
- Working with civil society and networks to involve them in the advocacy activities;
- Developing and supporting implementation of advocacy strategies e.g. radio spots, theatre, on a regional basis.

**IR 2.3: Increased public, private, and non-profit capacity for developing and implementing health policies and programs.**

In order to address the implementation gap and limited technical and management expertise in the region, I.R.3 will focus on increasing the institutional capacity of selected African organizations for health policy and program development and implementation in the region. Technical and financial support will continue to be offered to those institutions that have excelled in their technical domain and which can offer technical assistance in the region. These partner institutions will continue to receive USAID technical expertise for the development of managerial and technical capacity. In addition, particular attention will be placed on promoting the use of new information technologies to increase access to the state of the art information and improve communication within and between African and international organization. This IR will also increase technical capacities of African consultants and resource persons by increasing the supply of qualified professionals through human resource development. Training and work opportunities will be provided through fellowships, consulting experiences and long-distance education within the region.

**Achievement of this IR will be measured by:**

- 1) Composite indicator for organizational development of regional African partner institutions;
- 2) Number of regional consultancies carried out by African institutions;
- 3) Number of mentoring partnerships established between African and U.S. institutions; and
- 4) Number of centers of excellence established in key technical areas.



**Illustrative activities:**

- Institutional support for developing centers of excellence and strengthening regional partner institutions in organizational development, strategic planning and financing;
- Establishing regional teams of African experts with advanced training and technical PHN skills, e.g. social marketing, IEC, IMCI, maternal health/EOC; contraceptive technology;
- Expand technical capability of African institutions to develop, adapt and translate technical tools, manuals, materials on state-of-the-art PHN topics;
- Operations Research on strengthening institutional capacity in expanding service delivery and policy reform

**IR 2.4: Increased partner collaboration for transparent and efficient use of resources for developing and implementing health policies and programs.**

Given the serious health problems in the region and the need to increase the efficiency of available resources, it is of the paramount importance that partners increase communication and collaboration. Under this IR, USAID will continue to build upon these relationships and will explore additional opportunities for coordinated resource mobilization and diversification in program funding for priority areas such as HIV/AIDS and maternal health. Health sector reforms will be carried out in close consultation with USAID bilateral missions, the Title II management unit and other donors. The IR will attempt to utilize past investments and technical products to leverage donor funds in the region. Special attention will be given to develop mechanisms for promoting transparency and sharing of information, programs and budgets.

**Achievement of this IR will be measured by:**

- 1) Number of regional joint planning meetings among key donor partners;
- 2) Number of USAID Missions participating in planning and programming regional activities;
- 3) Number of regional multi-partner MOUs developed for joint action; and
- 4) Level of financing mobilized from sources other than USAID for expanding access to quality services in the region.

**Illustrative activities:**

- Building on MOUs with the World Bank in Côte d'Ivoire and the AfDB to provide technical assistance for ensuring better utilization of bank funding in non-presence countries;
- Leveraging the influence and activities of PPC in donor coordination for engaging the headquarters of major donor agencies such as World Bank, KfW, E.U., France on issue policy and operational guidance that foster collaborative activities for replicating demonstration programs at the country level;
- Mobilizing other donor resources for procuring contraceptive, ORS packets, drugs, vaccines and equipment;
- Taking advantage of the non-emergency humanitarian assistance and monetization of Title II programs to expand the role of key U.S partners in cross-border HIV/AIDS

interventions and enhance regional efforts in improving vitamin A status of young children. These activities will build on AFRICARE's role in FHA cross-border activities and BASICS's FHA regional activity on vitamin A in collaboration with CRAN and HKI;


- Coordinating with other donors to ensure more efficient use of limited resources for new initiatives such as "roll-back malaria", maternal and neonatal health programs;
- Strengthening regional coordination and advocacy efforts to leverage more resources for HIV/AIDS control and prevention; and
- Promoting the increased use of donor funds for public private partnerships.

**IR 2.5: Number of preliminary HIV/AIDS assessments and TA support visits in non-presence countries increased.**

SO2 needs to respond to the increasing number of requests of HIV/AIDS assistance recently coming from non-presence countries. These include Mauritania, and reportedly Niger, Chad, and Congo Brazzaville. The SO2 strategy would be to respond to these requests in a preliminary manner and negotiate the level of engagement on a case by case basis with each requesting country as we better understand the magnitude of the problem. FHA has already established a track record of leveraging its TA against other program elements with national governments and other donors. SO2 will continue to provide TA in order to leverage funds for programs in non-presence countries.

Conceivably additional funding for these activities can be anticipated annually through the Life Initiative, Embassy Self Help funds and local funds. Program complements such as condoms and STI supplies will be handled through regional social marketing programs. The HPN officers recommended the creation of a budget line item within FHA to finance the TA required for preliminary reviews and assessments. For example, FHA is sending a team to Mauritania to assess the request for assistance received by the US Embassy in that country.

**Figure III: SO2 for reproductive Health, HIV/AIDS/STI and Child Survival**



## C. Strategic Objective 3

### **Food security, and environmental and natural resources management (ENV/NRM) policies and programs strengthened and implemented in West Africa**

#### C.1 Problem Statement

Two-thirds of West Africa's population is rural and is directly engaged in the use of natural resources to obtain the bulk of their food and income needs. Food produced within the region is thought to account for about 75 % and 60% of food consumption in rural and urban areas, respectively. The region is thus highly dependent on rural production systems, and the environments upon which they depend, for food security, trade and continued economic growth and development. Threatening both food security and the environment is West Africa's extraordinarily high population growth. Population growth in West Africa exceeds that of any region in the world and has nearly tripled since the early 1960's. Prospects for the future remain disturbing, with nearly 50 per cent of the population below 15 years age.

Food security remains a preoccupation of countries throughout West Africa because of low absolute levels of food availability per capita and the very low-income levels of most people in the region.<sup>11</sup> Nutritional patterns in West Africa are worsening and child malnutrition is rising significantly. An alarming 50% of Malian children under five are visibly stunted, despite adequate crop harvests for the past ten years. Plausible reasons for this situation are that cash crops are displacing food crops in production, while family redistribution of cash income is not accommodating this change to assure adequate food purchases. In addition, traditional methods for raising small children do not adequately support weaned children until they are able to fend for themselves in the household.

While there is considerable diversity among the environmental and natural resources issues in the West Africa region, it is possible to assess and characterize these in a regional context. There are pockets of high bio-diversity and considerable investments have been made to establish national parks, forest reserves and other protected areas. But bio-diversity conservation is not a development priority for most people and institutions in the region. While there has been a significant decline in the moist tropical forest area of the coastal countries (notably Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire), a even more widespread problem is the overuse and gradual degradation of the vegetative cover of rangelands, farmed parklands, savannas and woodlands which dominate the region. In West Africa, desertification is a more important issue than global climate change related to the destruction of carbon sinks or the increased emissions of greenhouse gases. The most critical environmental issues have been those related to low and erratic rainfall, periodic drought, water shortages, uncontrolled land clearing, reduction of fuelwood stocks, wind and water erosion and declining soil fertility. All of these problems have been exacerbated by continued high rates of population growth,

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<sup>11</sup> Food security is defined as a situation in which "all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life".

inadequate investments in education and health, gender inequity, and generally weak governance.<sup>12</sup>

## **C.2 Strategic Objective**

Diagnostic studies have determined that the areas of priority concern include food security coordination, sustainable agriculture, environmental assessments, implementation of national environmental action plans, national resources policy elaboration and application, environment and NRM impact monitoring, and environmental awareness and education. USAID and other partners' on-going activities in these areas are described in detail in the bibliography reference Diagnostic Papers, Annex V noted above.

Taking into account the constraints and opportunities for food security and natural resources management in West Africa, the activities of other partners, and USAID's comparative advantage and available resources, Strategic Objective No. 3 (SO3) will focus on support to improved, regionally coherent policy and policy implementation.

The policy framework for regional food security issues, including coordination and information collection, disaster mitigation, management and reporting systems will be strengthened. Broader use of intensified production systems will be encouraged through policies that provide greater tenure security, that increase producers' access to competitively-priced fertilizer, greater access to markets, and greater knowledge by producers about the results of various systems on the farms of their peers in similar zones. Those policies that aim to reduce gender inequity will be encouraged. These actions will result in a 25 per cent decline in the number of the structurally food insecure population in West Africa.

Enhanced and effective implementation of Rural Code reforms through advocacy and exchange of information at regional organizations and fora will be supported. This will be another important opportunity to promote greater gender equity. The regional capacity for collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing of information about improved environmental and natural resource management practices and results will be strengthened. This will help to inform policy makers, to strengthen the advocates of natural resource management environmental programs, and to allow both female and male agricultural producers to better learn how their peers are coping with management challenges. These latter two activities are required to assure that West African institutions collaborate to design development programs and investment strategies to implement priorities growing out of the priority food security and environmental and natural resources management policy issues.

In high potential areas, such as river basins, food for work and monetization resources can be used to help support appropriate policy frameworks for regional integration projects where this input may leverage other donor funding. Donors have expressed interest in working together to develop river basins in West Africa to improve water availability across the region and to improve food security related to insufficient water to grow crops. The food aid resource could provide the leverage for other donors to coalesce on this sector in coordination with the on-going Sahel Regional Program (SRP) support to CILSS programs. SO3 is well suited to encourage dialogue and improved policy with regard to transnational river basin development issues, through the on-going SRP financed programs with CILSS.

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<sup>12</sup> See bibliography reference Diagnostics Paper, Annex V, "West Africa Regional Food Security and the Environment Sector", May 7, 1999 for background analysis.

Progress towards achieving SO3 will be measured by monitoring the following indicators and targets:

- Number of people in West Africa who are structurally food insecure is reduced by 25 per cent;
- West African regional organizations and associations collaboratively produce an assessment of priority food security policy issues at least once every three years;
- West African regional organizations and associations collaboratively produce an assessment of priority environmental and natural resource management policy issues at least once every three years;
- West African regional organizations and associations collaborate to design development programs and investment strategies to implement priorities growing out of the priority food security and environmental and natural resources management policy issues.

### **C. 3 Intermediate Results**

#### **IR 3.1: Improved regional food security monitoring and disaster mitigation systems**

Interventions will be implemented through continued support to regional West African institutions' (CILSS) programs that coincide with this IR to improve the capacity of West Africans to mitigate disasters related to periodic food shortages. Continued assistance is planned to improve West Africans' policy, planning, and monitoring capacities and food-related disaster mitigation systems. As Sahelian states are the most vulnerable to food deficits, the CILSS member states will continue to be the key focus of this IR, with potential for expansion of food security assessment into the coastal states. On-going food security SRP activities related to this IR will be continued and expanded upon over the life of WARP. Coordination with other USAID food security objectives (BHR/OFDA , BHR/FFP, AFR/SD), as well as WFP and other donors' activities will continue to be a priority.

#### **Illustrative Activities:**

##### Legacy activities from existing programs (SRP funded):

- Support to CILSS/AGRHYMET;
- Support to CILSS/PREGEC;
- Support to Club du Sahel;
- Support to WFP to improve vulnerability assessments and information exchange in the Sahel;
- Support to CILSS/INSAH Food Security Program;
- Work with CILSS, WFP and FAO to extend food needs assessments to include non-Sahelian West African countries; and
- Work with BHR/FFP, NGOs, WFP, USDA, and other donors to develop a rational food aid monetization plan for West Africa.

#### Proposed new activities:

- Create a USAID/West Africa technical advisory group on food security (TAG-FS). This group would be composed of members from the regional team, from the AFR/SD, from the Global Bureau, from BHR/OFDA, BHR/FFP, and the bilateral missions. This group would be responsible for assuring that the regional program is informed about programs, policies and resources available within USAID (and other donors) which are relevant to food security issues in West Africa. The regional team would be responsible for informing the group about emerging food security issues and programs in West Africa;
- Support to WFP to improve vulnerability assessments and information exchange in the Sahel;
- Work with CILSS, WFP and FAO to extend food needs assessments to include non-Sahelian West African countries; and
- Work with BHR/FFP, NGOs, WFP, USDA, and other donors to develop a rational food aid monetization plan for West Africa.

### **IR 3.2: Improved regional ENV/NRM monitoring and impact reporting systems**

Interventions will support regional West African institutions' (CILSS, etc.) programs and strategies which coincide with this IR. These activities are designed to build upon existing West African capacity to improve environmental and natural resources management policy, planning and monitoring and impact reporting systems. Existing international conventions (desertification, biodiversity and global warming) provide the legal framework for implementation under this IR. CILSS has been designated by ECOWAS as the technical lead in developing and monitoring desertification convention action plans at national and subregional levels for the ECOWAS states. On-going environmental and natural resources management SRP activities related to this IR will be continued and expanded over the life of WARP. Coordination with other USAID-funded environmental and natural resources management interventions (G/EGAD/AFS, AFR/SD, etc.), as well as interaction with key regional interventions by other donors will continue.

#### **Illustrative Activities:**

##### Legacy activities from existing programs (SRP-funded):

- Support to CILSS Headquarters for CCD monitoring of policy in West Africa;
- Support to CILSS/AGRHYMET and USGS for environmental and natural resources management monitoring in West Africa;
- Support to CILSS/AGRHYMET, CILSS/INSAH and USGS for assessing socio-economic and physical changes in resource management; and
- Support to CILSS and other regional institutions to help West Africa prepare for implementation of the Desertification and Biodiversity Conventions.

##### Proposed new activities:

- Create a USAID/West Africa technical advisory group on the environment and natural resource management (TAG-ENV). This group would be composed of members from the Global Bureau, AFR/SD, and the regional program. This group would be responsible for assuring that the regional program is informed

about policies, programs and initiatives within USAID (and other donors) which are relevant to environmental and natural resource management issues in West Africa. The regional program would be responsible for informing the group about emerging issues and programs in West Africa;

- Support to CILSS/AGRYMET, CILSS/INSAH and USGS for assessing socio-economic and physical changes in resource management for West Africa; and
- Support to CILSS and other regional institutions to help Sahelian countries prepare for implementation of the Desertification and Biodiversity Conventions.

### **IR 3.3: Increased capacity of agricultural and ENV/NRM organizations and networks to communicate and advocate**

Interventions will be implemented through support to regional West African institutions' (CILSS, etc.) programs that coincide with this IR. These activities are designed to strengthen existing West African capacity to develop more effective networks and advocacy fora in the AG/NRM sectors; especially for women, given their key role in these sectors. Emphasis will be placed on improving the capacity of these groups and networks to influence policy, planning and monitoring and impact reporting systems for the agriculture – natural resource – food security nexus. On-going DG/ENV/AG SRP activities related to this IR will be continued and expanded over the life of WARP. Coordination with other USAID-funded DG/ENV/AG program and policy interventions (G/EGAD/AFS, AFR/SD, etc.), as well as key regional interventions by other donors, will continue under this IR.

#### **Illustrative Activities:**

##### Legacy activities from existing programs (SRP-funded):


- Support CILSS NRM policy and technical programs.

##### Proposed new activities:

- Execute inventory and assessment of AG, and ENV/NRM civil groups; and
- Work with civil groups to identify priority interests and actions.



**Figure IV: SO3 for Food Security and ENV/NRM**



## **D. Special Objective for Conflict Prevention**

**Early detection and response mechanisms to prevent regional conflicts established and functioning.**

### **D.1 Problem Statement**

Internal and cross-border conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and the Casamance region of Senegal, have been disruptive to West African economic, social, and political development since 1989. The costs in human life and property have spread across state borders, constituting a key impediment to development throughout the region. Although African peacekeeping and rehabilitation efforts advance regional peace and security, *ex-post facto* efforts are costly and frequently viewed as interventionist and meddlesome.

Conflict avoidance initiatives offer a viable alternative to peacekeeping actions, but are relatively uncoordinated, untested, and not yet institutionalized. Civil society groups scattered throughout the region focus individually on conflict prevention, without the benefit of connecting with similar organizations in neighboring countries. Donors have tended to neglect prevention in favor of mitigation. State institutional capacity is weak: Indeed, no successful region-wide model for preventing conflicts in West Africa exists.

On the bright side, the high costs of peacekeeping and rehabilitation have raised interest in conflict prevention, both on the part of states and donors. In December 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) voted in favor of instituting a Conflict Prevention Mechanism (CPM) for early detection and prevention of conflicts in the region. Because ECOWAS is a regional organization with 16 members— both Francophone and Anglophone—with a record in peacekeeping, it is uniquely positioned to develop a participatory and responsive mechanism with wide African ownership. Given its peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, it is uniquely positioned to develop a participatory and responsive mechanism with wide African ownership. In support of this role, the European Union (EU) has committed \$2 million toward supporting the implementation of the mechanism.

Three key constraints could impede implementation of the mechanism. First, ECOWAS' technical and administrative capacity to perform conflict detection and early response is thin, both in headquarters and in the field. Lower to mid-level staff will need training and support. Organizational development is also weak. Second, civil society organizations are minimally involved in conflict prevention because of technical, financial, and political reasons. Nevertheless, ECOWAS is unlikely to achieve its prevention goals without effective civil society partnership. Third, donor support for prevention is currently uncoordinated. Donors have the financial resources and the technical expertise, but a piecemeal approach limits effectiveness. However, with the relative impartiality the organization could facilitate implementation of the mechanism.

## D.2 Special Objective

USAID will use its knowledge and expertise in public administration and policy, civil society strengthening, information sharing, and donor coordination, to help ECOWAS develop the capacities and conditions for the prevention of conflicts. Consistent with Agency Goal Six, this will help save lives, avoid suffering associated with man-made disasters, and establish conditions necessary for political and/or economic development. Specifically, it will contribute to USAID Objective 6.1: “the potential impact of crises reduced” through the early detection and possible avoidance of potentially violent conflagrations. Additionally, the program components in training, capacity-building, and information dissemination within ECOWAS will contribute to USAID’s Objective 2.4, “More transparent and accountable government institutions encouraged.”

Lessons learned from USAID conflict prevention programs in other part of Africa (i.e. REDSO/ESA) strongly suggest that to be successful, a prevention strategy needs to be regional in scope, agreed upon by multiple states, enforceable, and demonstrate African ownership. In addition, this strategy will be expected to function in synergy with bilateral missions in the region, in such a way as to add value to conflict-related programs currently approved or under implementation in Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Liberia and Nigeria.

Support for a prevention mechanism will contribute to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The U.S. Department of State’s International Affairs Strategic Plan emphasizes the prevention and elimination of conflict as a principal foreign policy goal. The Secretary of State Albright reiterated this point during her Africa tour in October 1999. Overall, this effort offers the U.S. an opportunity to support an African-led effort to promote development by building peace and stability in the region.

The mechanism itself envisions the establishment of four Observations and Monitoring Centers (OMC) within the region, located in Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia and Liberia. Under the guidance of ECOWAS’ Secretariat in Abuja, the observatories will gather information on factors likely to disturb the peace in the sub-region. At the level of the Secretariat, a Mediation and Security Council (MSC) will recommend action to member states, and an *ad hoc* body, the Council of Elders, will mediate in potential conflicts

The lack of precedent in terms of conflict prevention initiatives in the region, and the uncertainty of sustained future USAID funding argue for placing these activities within the framework of a Special Objective (SPO) in the WARP, with an initial four-year time period.

Additional components of this SPO will include the following:

**Regional Civil Society networking and advocacy capacity-building.** Participation of civil society in conflict prevention, particularly women, has been marginal to date, but represents a necessary aspect in this initiative. Civil society groups have formed a coalition for conflict management in Mali, where women have constituted the African Women’s Anti-War Coalition, a regional organization, with membership in four West African states. In December 1998, this organization issued a declaration urging international agencies and industrialized countries to work toward the prevention of conflict. Thus, civil society constitutes an important advocate for pressuring states to end present conflicts and to prevent their recurrence in the future. Such organizations ensure ownership of the process by African

peoples, and play important roles in representation, media support, and dissemination of information.

**Donor Coordination.** Considering weaknesses in the institutional capacity of ECOWAS and civil society, donor coordination is vital. Dispersed or contradictory activities will impede progress in implementing the CPM and in achieving the SPO. Efforts will be made to guide donor assistance toward focused and complimentary conflict prevention programs.

**Governance.** As a key element of democracy, governance has gained increased importance and commitment by governments, civil society, regional institutions and donors in West Africa. However, institutions remain weak, and the knowledge base concerning governance issues still low. As a cross-cutting theme of the WARP, governance will focus on developing indigenous institutional capacities as a way of accelerating the internalization of governance values and practices by West Africans. Particular emphasis will be placed on fighting corruption through greater transparency, participation and the observance of rule of law in the public and private sectors at regional levels.

Successful implementation of the governance theme will rely on close synergy with other SOs of the strategy, through the identification of common areas of intervention for greater cost effectiveness and value-added. For example, training in advocacy for conflict prevention practitioners could also include civil society organizations involved in economic reform, health issues and environmental protection. Special sessions would then be devoted to exchanges of information and the use of information technologies, awareness building on the interrelations between various areas of development (i.e. economic growth/health/environmental protection, or conflict/health/economic growth etc.), and coordination for optimal results. Efforts will be made to identify and appropriately take into account gender issues, to allow for equitable participation and protection of particularly vulnerable and marginalized sections of the population, such as women and children in activity development and implementation.

**Sharing of lessons learned and best practices:** Although USAID involvement in conflict prevention in West Africa is relatively recent, several of its bilateral missions, including Senegal, Mali, Nigeria and Guinea, have carried out or are currently implementing conflict-related activities. In addition, USAID has a long history of activity in Democracy, Governance and decentralization in the region. Sharing lessons-learned and best practices among the community of conflict prevention practitioners, particularly among bilateral missions, and between them and the WARP is essential for ensuring greater programming complementarity and value-added to bilateral activities.

### **D.3 Intermediate Results**

Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), civil society networks and donor agencies, including USAID bilateral missions, constitute key players in regional integration processes in West Africa. Progress towards the goal of conflict prevention and overall regional political stability will, therefore, depend on collective and synergistic action of these key actors.

Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) have the explicit mandate to promote regionalism. As such, they must assume leadership of efforts to develop sound policies and mechanisms to limit the occurrence of violent conflicts in the region. This, in turn, requires

strong institutional capacities, and the willingness to accept the participation of civil society in their efforts.

Conversely, strong regional Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can play an important role in holding regional institutions accountable. CSOs can also advocate for greater commitment to conflict prevention efforts, while expanding the capacity to detect and pre-empt conflicts at community level, among those who bear the greatest brunt of conflict conflagrations.

Considering the importance of their financial support, donors are well positioned to contribute their technical expertise and experience, as well as to exert positive pressure on regional organizations for prompt implementation of decisions in conflict prevention.

Finally, as a donor with field missions in the region, and comparative advantage in governance and conflict prevention, USAID can measurably enhance the impact of its activities, through greater and more efficient coordination of its activities, and internal awareness of regional issues.

### **IR 1: Operational capacity of ECOWAS' CPM enhanced**

This IR focuses on building the institutional capacity of ECOWAS to establish and operate the conflict detection portion of the CPM. Protocols and other documents governing the operation of the OMCs must be drafted and adopted and staff assigned to operate the four Centers will need to receive the professional preparation necessary to bring the Centers into operation. In addition, member states must cooperate in human, financial, and material aspects of the project. At a minimum, they must ratify a protocol with appropriate policies, methods, and tools for operation. They must also constitute an effective Council of Elders, and consult regularly with their civil society and donor partners.

#### **Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) Member states' support for the CPM, and their financial contributions for its operation;
- 2) Development of documentation outlining the terms of reference for operation of the CPMs, and for data collection and transmission from member states;
- 3) Routine, analytical reporting on conflict areas;
- 4) Increased number of regional conflicts that are monitored through CPMs;
- 5) Degree of satisfaction reported by CSOs regarding the CPM effectiveness; and
- 6) The impartiality of Council of Elders decisions.

#### **Illustrative activities include:<sup>13</sup>**

- Training and technical assistance, to include support in the areas of organizational development and information technology;
- Assistance in establishing connectivity between local data sources and OMCs, and in developing data collection and dissemination capacities;
- Assistance in the establishment of interfaces with civil society organizations, national-level committees, and communications networks of the states connected to each Center; and

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<sup>13</sup> Unlike SOs 1, 2 and 3, which consist of ongoing and new activities, this SPO is based entirely on new activities.

- Technical assistance for the preparation of terms of reference for the Council of Elders and the Mediation and Security Council, as well as limited logistical support for their operation.

As an implementation strategy, USAID will recommend to other partners adoption of an incremental approach to the establishment of the OMCs. In part, this recommendation is made on the basis of practical considerations, primarily the availability of financial resources, but also in view of the many logistical and procedural questions that are likely to arise in conjunction with actual operation of the facility. Such issues should be addressed and resolved before proceeding with the establishment of the additional centers proposed. Based on available logistical data (relative to infrastructure and telecommunications issues, as well as proximity to Abuja), it is recommended that the first site be established in Benin.

## **IR 2: Enhanced capacity of regional civil society organizations to participate in conflict detection and response.**

CSOs involvement will complement the work of ECOWAS. At the same time, they will provide an essential channel for data communication, and serve as a check on potential abuses of the system. Success of the CPM depends on a broad-based and unbiased reporting of potential conflict indicators throughout the region. As such, CSOs are critical to the success of the observatories. While USAID anticipates working with existing CSOs, particularly those involved in decentralization efforts, these organizations will need additional specialized training and technical assistance in monitoring, analysis, conflict mediation at community levels, and advocacy in support of the CPMs objectives.

### **Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) Development of an action plan to establish a network of CSOs;
- 2) Increased use of the Internet as a means of communication with OMCs;
- 3) Increased frequency of contacts between civic society groups and the OMC;
- 4) Women's groups actively participate by collecting and providing relevant data to the OMCs; and
- 5) Decisions taken to prevent unresolved conflicts directly reflect citizens/CSO advocacy and use of OMCs.

### **Illustrative activities include:**

- Training in data collection, analysis and dissemination for CSOs collaborating with OMCs; and
- Capacity-building for CSOs in the areas of conflict prevention/resolution, and regional networking and advocacy.

## **IR 3: Increased donor coordination in building regional capacity to detect and respond to regional conflicts.**

The activities under this IR are designed to support the establishment and operation of the CPMs, doing so in a fully coordinated and consistent fashion. As outlined in section III, a strong base of donor support of the CPM already exists, both in the form of technical and monetary assistance. These individual efforts must be melded into a cohesive strategy, that ensures that all components essential to operation of the CPM are addressed, and that

implementation proceeds in a manner that avoids duplication of effort, competitive or inconsistent approaches.

**Achievement of this I.R. will be measured by:**

- 1) Donors participate in conflict prevention network and share relevant information;
- 2) Semi-annual coordination meetings are held;
- 3) Donors adopt a common framework and rationalize division of labor according to program needs; and
- 4) Donors support West African implementation plans by developing common indicators.

**Illustrative Activities:**

- Technical assistance for the development of a donor coordination plan, framework and indicators; and
- Support for the organization of meetings, sharing of information and the development and dissemination of reports

USAID anticipates that the need for careful donor coordination will be an ongoing necessity that will continue over the life of the program. As such, existing ad hoc donor coordination efforts should be rationalized, and semi-annual donor coordination meetings be scheduled to review progress towards goals, and to allow for modifications of the implementation strategies, as dictated by practical realities of program operation.

**IR4: Lessons-learned and best practices to avoid, mitigate or transition from conflict to democratic governance shared regionally.**

This IR seeks to enhance USAID's contribution to regional political stability. Through increased knowledge of local realities and awareness of regional implications of conflict, USAID as a whole is more likely to design activities that better respond to the needs West African communities both at grassroots and regional levels. Particular focus will be placed in supporting the participation of grassroots communities in conflict prevention processes, using decentralization as a framework for mutual learning and problem solving.

**Achievement of this IR will be measured by:**

- 1) Increased frequency of contact and dialogue among DG/conflict Prevention bilateral SOs, and between them and the WARP SPO;
- 2) Number of meetings of cross border communities, jointly organized by USAID bilateral missions and the WARP SPO; and
- 3) USAID bilateral programs reflect sub-regional and regional dimensions and concerns.


**Illustrative activities include:**

- Regular exchanges of information, reports and other relevant documentation relating to bilateral and WARP conflict prevention and governance activities;

- Annual thematic workshops of DG Officers in the region, including staff of contracting partners collaborating with bilateral SOs and the WARP SPO in Governance and Conflict Prevention; and
- Support for the organization of joint cross-border meetings and training workshops between USAID bilateral missions in neighboring countries.



**Figure V: SPO for Conflict Prevention**



### **III. Program Implementation Plan**

#### **A. WARP Management Overview**

The proposed management of the WARP represents a consolidation and streamlining of existing, on-going programs being implemented by the Africa Bureau. The rationale for a revised management approach is to seek increased operational efficiencies and program complementarity which will lead to enhanced regional integration and development results, complementing and enhancing the work of the bilateral missions in the region.

With varying degrees of success, USAID has implemented regional programs in several different ways. From this experience, multiple lessons have emerged. First, regional programs have succeeded only when the programs have been truly regional (versus multi-national) and have collaborated with regional institutions. Second, to be successful, a regional program must have clearly defined objectives with a separate operating unit. Finally, unless there is a strong commitment to the regional program by senior level agency leadership, it is unlikely to succeed.

Lessons learned from previous regional AID experience have been incorporated into the proposed WARP implementation plan. The consultants who conducted a management assessment of the WARP, along with the Governing Board, debated a wide range of options for the structure of the regional program. Options included the establishment of a separate operating unit with its own budget and staff as a unit headed by a Deputy Director responsible for overseeing a regional implementation unit as part of the USAID bi-lateral Mission. In the end the Governing Board concluded that it is necessary that the WARP be constituted as a separate operating unit with its own budget and staff.<sup>14</sup> To ensure the autonomy of the regional program, the Governing Board has recommended that the new unit be headed by a Director drawn from the ranks of the Senior Management Group. The Board felt that strong senior level management would be especially critical given the highly dispersed geographic character of the WARP's staffing, programs and donor coordination efforts.

Given that the WARP staff is located in four different countries (i.e., Washington, D.C., Mali, Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire), the issue of internal coordination and reporting relationships requires considerable attention. The implementation of the WARP will require close coordination among the Global Bureau, AFR/WA, AFR/SD, USAID/Mali, USAID/Senegal, USAID/Nigeria, USAID/Ghana, and the RST, in order to bring the various elements of the strategy under a single management unit. It is proposed that as soon as the WARP is approved by USAID/W, the RST staff will meet with the present SRP staff and the FHA Cognizant Technical Officer to establish a timetable for the transition of the management of these programs to the field – in fact, much of this planning is underway. Numerous actions and issues will require detailed attention. These include developing a time line; transferring program files and documentation; arranging introductions to the implementing partners; reviewing the pending actions; scheduling all planned program activities for the remainder of the 2000 fiscal year; conducting financial reviews or if required.

Staffing will be a critical issue during the transition period. While it is not recommended that the number of USDH staff be increased, the existing USDH position descriptions and classifications will require some modification. For example, the WARP Director, who will

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<sup>14</sup> WARP Management Assessment: Final Report, Development Associates, Inc., November 1999

collaborate with the Governing Board on regional issues of mutual interest, is currently a Supervisory PDO position, which will need reclassification. The other position descriptions and classifications do not fully reflect the nature of the work and responsibilities of staff members. The RST will focus on personnel issues immediately after approval of the WARP to assume full management responsibilities for the WARP by FY2001.

The creation of an independent management unit will require numerous steps as outlined in ADS Series 100, including a number of delegations of authority to the new Director. A decision will be needed as to what authorities the WARP Director will possess for non-presence countries. Moreover, as many WARP activities will take place in both presence and non-presence countries, operational protocols will need to be established with the US embassies in countries in the region.

Dialogue will begin immediately between the relevant USAID/Washington Bureaus, the West Africa bilateral missions and the RST staff to ensure a smooth and orderly transition of activities to and subsequent operation of the WARP.

### **A.1 Relationship to Other USAID Programs**

The West African Regional Program will be a separate operating unit within the Africa Bureau, with an approved strategic plan and a management contract. It will have three principal types of relationships to other USAID programs: complementary, support services, and customer relations.

### **A.2 Complementarity**

The WARP will complement and enhance the bilateral programs in West Africa. As stated in the October 1998 concept paper, we must approach West Africa regionally because our West African partners are asking us to do so. The issues on which the strategy proposes to concentrate, require a regional approach to be successful.

Addressing the regional constraints and opportunities is a parallel challenge to addressing the bilateral constraints to development and is of equal importance. Thus the relationship with the bilateral programs will be separate and distinct, but symbiotic.

### **A.3 Support Services**

For core administrative services, the WARP will draw extensively on the USAID/Mali and USAID/Senegal including financial management (OFM), contracting (ACQ), logistical executive (MGT) and legal support (RLA). Agreements with these two bilateral missions to ensure adequate support services will be negotiated as OE resources become available.

### **A.4 Customer Relations**

As with other field-based Africa operating units, the WARP will draw extensively on technical support from AFR/SD and the Global Bureau (in particular, the Energy and Environmental Technology Office). Where appropriate, inter-agency agreements may be developed with other USG agencies when technical expertise is required.

## B. Human Resources

At the present, the RST consists of three USDH and three FSN (two of which are administrative positions). In addition, the RST houses one USPSC, an ATRIP-funded economist, who handles trade and investment issues. Additional staff support is provided by USAID/Mali, USAID/Senegal and USAID/Ghana. USAID/Mali provides 25% of the time of the USDH Democracy and Governance Officer as well as financial, procurement and management support services. The USDH Supervisory Health Officer in USAID/Senegal is assuming responsibility for the management of SO2 of the regional strategy. It is estimated that this will require 50% of the officer's time. USAID/Senegal also provides legal services to the RST and will provide procurement and management support to the FHA program. The FHA is managed in Abidjan by a six member program-funded staff, three of whom are at the professional level. It is anticipated that one additional professional position will be added for increased HIV/AIDS activities.

A USPSC in USAID/Ghana has been handling regional responsibilities associated with the West Africa Gas pipeline, but this arrangement will end when the WARP is approved. In USAID/W, the recent transfer of the SRP USDH Director to a new position has left two RSSAs responsible for management of the SRP. See table 6 below.

**Table 6: Current and Projected Workforce Requirements**

Table 6A : FY 2000 West Africa Regional Staff Levels							
Unit/Program	USDH	PASA	RSSA	TCN/POP Fellow	USPSC	FSN	TOTAL
RST (Mali)	3.0			1.0	1.0	2.0	7.0
SRP (AID/W)			2.0				2.0
FHA (Côte d'Ivoire)				1.0	1.0	4.0	6.0
Bi-Lateral Support Provided:							
Sectoral (SO2 & SPO)	0.8						0.8
Support Services	1.5					2.5	4.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>19.8</b>

Table 6B: FY 2001 - FY 2008 WARP Staff Levels							
Unit/Program	USDH	PASA	RSSA	TCN/POP Fellow	USPSC	FSN	TOTAL
WARP	3.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	7.0	17.0
Bi-Lateral Support Provided:							
Sectoral (SO2 & SPO)	0.8						0.8
Support Services	0.5					2.5	3.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>20.8</b>

The new regional strategy with the integration of the SRP and the FHA and the initiation of new activities in economic integration, trade, energy and conflict resolution, will require flexible and innovative management and staffing given the resource constraints facing the Agency. Thus, the team needed to implement the WARP (excluding institutional contractors) is planned in 4 locations. The following chart shows the number and location of WARP personnel/staffing requirements.

## **WARP Program Team, FY 2001 – 2008**

### **Management Core**

USDH WARP Director	(Mali)
FSN Administrative Assistant (0.5 FTE)	(Mali)

### **SO 1 Team**

USDH Private Enterprise Officer/Team Leader	(Mali)
USPSC Trade Economist	(Mali)
FSN Program Management Assistant (0.5 FTE)	(Mali)

### **SO 2 Team**

USDH Health Officer/Team Leader (0.5 FTE) (co-share with Senegal)	
USPSC FHA Director	(Côte d'Ivoire)
TCN/Pop. Fellow Dep. Director	(Côte d'Ivoire)
TCN/Pop. Fellow AIDS Advisor	(Côte d'Ivoire)
FSN Support Staff (4 FTE)	(Côte d'Ivoire)
FSN Management Assistant	(Senegal)

### **SO 3 Team**

USDH General Development Officer/Team Leader	(Mali)
US PASA Agriculture and Food Security Advisor	(Mali)
FSN Program Management Assistant (0.5 FTE) (co-share with Mali)	

### **SPO Team**

TCN Democracy and Governance Team Leader	(Mali)
FSN Program Management Assistant (0.5 FTE)	(Mali)
USDH Democracy and Governance Officer (0.3 FTE)	(Mali)

### **Support Services**

US RSSA Program Support Coordinator	(Washington)
USDH & FSN OFM and Procurement Assistance	(0.5 FTE)(Mali and Senegal)
FSN Support Services (2.5 FTE)	(Mali)

## **C. Budgetary Resources**

In the preparation of the WARP, USAID/W instructed the RST to develop an Operating Year Budget (OYB) based on a projected resource level of approximately \$28 million. This OYB level borrows from existing resources including \$16.7 million for the FHA program, \$7.0 million for the SRP-related activities, additional ATRIP funding and \$2 million in other direct assistance. Table 7 summarizes the program and resource implications for such a

scenario. It shows that the proposed OYB level would contribute to several of the Agency goals, in particular in health, economic growth and environmental protection.

**Table 7: Planned Program Resource Levels (FYs 2000 – 2007) <sup>15</sup>**  
**Base Scenario (million \$)**

Strategic (SO) and (SPO) Objectives	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007
<b>Growth SO:</b> Regional economic integration in West Africa is enhanced through assistance to public and private sector institutions.	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
<b>Health SO:</b> Increased, sustainable use of selected reproductive health, STI/HIV/AIDS child survival and maternal health services and/or products in West Africa.	16.7	16.7	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5
<b>Food Security SO:</b> The development and implementation of policies that promote sustainable food security and environmental/natural resources Management is improved.	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
<b>Conflict Prevention SPO:</b> Early detection and response mechanism to prevent regional conflicts in place and functioning.	0.5	0.5	0.5				
<b>Total OYB including field support</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>29.5</b>
PL-480 Title II (to be explored)					0.5	1.5	2.5

The proposed OYB assumes a continuous flow of additional funding from ATRIP or its successor program. If this funding source were to disappear in the future, SO1 would be required to reduce its activities in proportion to funding reduction. OYB increases are foreseen over the life of the strategy for SO2. The Regional Team expects to explore the possibly of monetization of Title II funds for use in conjunction with SO1 and SO3 activities.

## **D. Donor Coordination**

### **D.1. Background**

Throughout this document, most of the programs presented in the WARP strategy are best undertaken on a multi-country basis both for reasons of returns to scale and/or large externalities (e.g. agricultural research, river basin development) as well as the fact that the small size of the economies of the countries of the region, combined with their multiple and overlapping interdependencies, argues for broader economic integration. Because of the complexity of a regional agenda, the regional programs greatly vary among donors. The Europeans use the term variable geometry to describe the structure of donor coordination, which captures the ad hoc character of existing arrangements. No donor appears to have a clearly articulated strategy for regional integration or any supporting regional administrative

<sup>15</sup> FY2000 funding has been approved at \$2m, in addition to on-going FHA (\$16.8m) and SRP (\$6.285m).

structure outside of headquarters. The Europeans meet periodically within the context of the EC's indicative program, which has a regional component, but as with all donors, the bulk of the resources are in-country programs with regional programs managed out of Brussels. The UNDP has annual meetings for West and Central Africa, but they are organizational, not programming, meetings with program coordination located in New York. The World Bank has a regional office in Abidjan where it administers regional programs, particularly in economic infrastructure and support for regional institutions. However, there is currently no overall regional strategy and the bulk of analysis and coordination is done in the headquarters in Washington D.C.

There are exceptions. First, European support for UEMOA and its monetary and customs union is central to the EU's long-term strategy. Second, there is broad donor support for an integrated approach to the problems of the Sahel, articulated in the Club du Sahel and the CILSS. Third, in specific sectors regional cooperation is well established, most notably in the PHN area where the regional offices of the specialized UN agencies provide a coordinating mechanism. Finally, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has just prepared a strategy for regional integration which could serve as an integrating framework for the donor community.

In addition to the AfDB, ECOWAS is a potential mechanism for coordination. While not all donors view ECOWAS as a viable center for regional cooperation, there is a possibility that a planned rationalization of responsibilities between CILSS, UEMOA and ECOWAS could revitalize the organization. Currently, there is no donor consultative mechanism associated with ECOWAS. The WARP, however, throughout its formulation, has closely associated other donors and developed strong collaborative working relationships which should help to overcome the lack of a consultative mechanism.

## **D.2. Strategy**

The obstacles to a USAID donor coordination strategy for WARP, therefore, include the paucity of donor frameworks and strategies for the region, the present lack of any region-wide forum or mechanism for a donor dialogue, and, with the exception of the AfDB, the lack of donor program headquarters within the region. The "variable geography" approach suggests that it may not be necessary to find a single donor coordination mechanism for consultations on overall regional integration. It may be sufficient for the current planning period to focus coordination in sectors or sub-regions if a mechanism can be found to achieve a broad donor consensus on the parameters of a regional framework.

- A high priority, therefore, for the WARP is to find a mechanism for the donors to articulate a common regional strategy. There are two potential candidates for such a conceptual role. First, the World Bank might be able to undertake a broadly participatory approach to a strategy for the region. Secondly, some donors have suggested that the African Development Bank might be able to play such a role, especially as it now has formulated its own regional integration strategy. Perhaps the two banks could jointly lead such an effort. Upon adoption of the strategy by the Africa Bureau, WARP staff, Africa Bureau, and PPC/DP should collaborate to explore and encourage such a framework exercise that would include ECOWAS, the two Banks and major donors.



In the absence of a region-wide donor coordination mechanism, the WARP will need to establish bilateral consultations with key donors. The top priority will be the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank.

The USAID-EC annual consultations, tentatively scheduled for March 2000 in Washington. Preliminary consultations by PPC have identified regional economic integration as a potential focus for the consultations. Africa Bureau and WARP may wish to suggest a side meeting on West Africa as part of that dialogue, with the intention of establishing a regular consultative mechanism as an outcome. PPC could facilitate that consultation in cooperation with WARP and AFR. PPC and Africa Bureau should approach the World Bank and the African Development bank to suggest annual donor consultations, preferably in Abidjan. The WARP will, for the first time, bring together coherent management of the Agency's regional activities in West Africa. It will be essential for the WARP to consolidate management of donor coordination activities and to establish clear linkages with related Africa Bureau and other USAID coordination efforts. Currently the communication gaps pose a significant constraint.

Expanding and cultivating sustainable relationships with the other donors in the region is vital if the WARP is to succeed. Donors must work towards a consensus on an analytic framework of the problems, constraints to, and opportunities for accelerating regional integration in West Africa. This will have to be a priority implementation action.

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